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Abstract
This paper constructs a model of an exchange economy in which bankruptcy arises in a man-
ner similar to what we observe. Compared to related models, this model is a more realistic rep-
resentation of some markets in which intertemporal assets are traded. Using standard and natural
assumptions, it is shown that every economy represented by this model has an equilibrium. There-
fore, bankruptcy can co-exist with smoothly functioning competitive markets in fairly general
economies. Examples highlight some welfare effects of bankruptcy.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, household debt has increased greatly, and a greater proportion of this
debt is being traded in asset markets through securitized pools of assets. According
to the Federal Reserve, home mortgage and other consumer debt increased from
$3.3 trillion at the end of 1990 to $7.1 trillion at the end of 2001, and the proportion
of this debt that is securitized and outstanding in capital markets increased from
34 percent to 55 percent over the same period.
An increase in household debt has also been accompanied by an increase in the
personal bankruptcy rate, from 2.8 per thousand people in 1990 to 5.1 per thousand
in 2001. Thus, there is a greater chance that a household’s debt is currently being
traded in asset markets through a securitized pool of assets, and bankruptcy affects
creditors invested in such pools. Because agents can be buyers of some assets and
sellers of others, default by some debtors leads to partial recovery for their creditors
and this might force these creditors to default on their debt to others. This can
set off a chain reaction resulting in widespread default and bankruptcy. As more
and more people invest in asset markets (either directly or indirectly) these chain
reactions can potentially affect a large proportion of the population.
These observations show that in order to understand the operation of modern
competitive asset markets, it is important to understand how bankruptcies filter
through and affect investors in a securitized pool of assets, how they affect recovery
rates on assets, and how they affect trading and the allocation of resources through
the mechanism of markets. To do this, it is important to understand the legal
framework governing bankruptcy (for example, the rights of creditors and debtors in
bankruptcy law and the role of exemptions), and the trading institutions governing
credit (for example, the effects of credit limits on asset trade and the role of an
agent’s default history in determining her credit limit and future trading ability).
This paper constructs a model of an exchange economy that can be used to
analyze these issues. The view in this paper (and also in some of the other papers
mentioned below) is that default and bankruptcy are important economic phenom-
ena that can be part of an economic equilibrium with competitive markets, and
these phenomena are consistent with smoothly functioning asset markets.
As we know, in our society, the issue of bankruptcy is very old. In the United
States, a Bankruptcy clause (Clause 4 of Section 8 of Article I) was adopted in
its Constitution on September 3, 1787 (see Warren (1935), page 5). There might
be moral arguments for allowing agents to discharge their debt. However, as the
following paragraphs show, debates on bankruptcy bills provide ample economic
justifications for such a discharge.
Allowing for repudiation of debt through bankruptcy law can increase economic
activity and improve welfare of society. This idea has been in public discussion for
at least 200 years. For example, Warren (1935), on page 16, writes the following
about the debate on a bankruptcy bill in 1792; “the advocates of the bill, largely
1
Sabarwal: Competitive Equilibria, Incomplete Markets, Endogenous Bankruptcy
Brought to you by | University of Kansas Libraries (University of Kansas Libraries)
Authenticated | 172.16.1.226
Download Date | 3/20/12 8:14 PM
from the commercial sections of the country, pointed out the necessity of restoring
to active trade-life the thousands of debtors then in jail or else unable to resume
business by reason of their load of undischarged debts; and they further urged the
necessity of preventing such a condition from again arising.” And again on page
18, “As Jefferson wrote to Madison: ‘The whole commercial race are lying on their
oars and gathering in their affairs, not knowing what new failure may put their
resources to the proof.’ In the existing stagnation of commerce, he said, loans could
not be made or money transferred from one city to another.” Using the language of
modern economics, we can say that an equilibrium in an economy with bankruptcy
can have more asset trade than, and strongly pareto dominate an equilibrium in the
corresponding economy without bankruptcy.
Similarly, the idea of an optimal bankruptcy law, one that balances rights of
a creditor against the misfortune of a debtor, has been in public discussion for
at least 200 years. For example, Warren (1935), on page 17, writes the following
about the views of James A. Bayard of Delaware in 1792, “A bankrupt law he held
was necessary to protect creditors from dishonest and fraudulent debtors, as well
as to enable creditors to protect honest debtors whose trade had been subjected
to unforeseen accidents who shall surrender all their property in order to obtain a
discharge.” And again on page 166, he quotes the following objective of a bankruptcy
law from the papers of James A. Bayard, “Its object is, in the first place, to support
mercantile credit, by protecting the rights of creditors against the fraud of dishonest
and the folly of imprudent debtors who may waste or conceal their property while
the ordinary forms of law are going on against them; and secondly to encourage fair
industry and prudent conduct, by enabling honest debtors reduced by misfortune, to
give up their property, free themselves entirely from their debts, and begin the world
anew, which no man will ever have the courage to do, while a load of old debts is
hanging on him.” Thus, an optimal credit limit and exemption level depends, among
other things, on the characteristics of the agents in the economy.1
In economics, there is an extensive literature on bankruptcy. The models in this
literature provide important insights about optimal debt contracts, about optimal
corporate debt versus equity, and about dynamic credit cycles. The reader can get
a flavor of some of these models from the important papers of Townsend (1979),
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Aghion and Hermalin (1990), Hart and Moore (1994),
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996), White (1998),
and Wang and White (2000). This list is by no means comprehensive. Models in
the partial equilibrium framework do not always capture the feedback effects that
are captured naturally in the general equilibrium framework, some of these models
exogenously specify whether an economic agent is a debtor or creditor, (hence in
these models, agents cannot be buyers of some assets and sellers of others,) and
1For more details on the history of bankruptcy law, the reader can consult Warren (1935) and
Dunscomb(Jr.) (1898).
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there is little heterogeneity among the economic agents involved.
The first papers to include bankruptcy in general equilibrium with complete
markets appear to be by Shubik (1972), and Shubik and Wilson (1977). In the
framework of an extensive model of general equilibrium with complete markets, the
seminal paper by Kehoe and Levine (1993) draws on the literature on dynamic
consistency, and introduces individual rationality constraints in the form of endoge-
nous debt limits. These constraints imply that in an equilibrium, no agent defaults
in any state. Alvarez and Jermann (2000) (building on Kehoe and Levine (1993)
and Kocherlakota (1996)) cast these constraints in the form of portfolio constraints,
and investigate limited risk-sharing. These models provide important insights in
understanding consumption and risk sharing, but by their very construction, these
models cannot explain the existence of default or bankruptcy as an equilibrium
phenomenon.
The model presented in this paper belongs to the class of economic models
of general equilibrium with incomplete markets, or GEI-models.2 This framework
includes the seminal paper by Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Shubik (1997), and other
models proposed by Zame (1993), Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Zame (1997), Modica,
Rustichini, and Tallon (1999), and Araujo and Pascoa (2002). Some of the economic
justifications for allowing default and bankruptcy that are mentioned above can be
seen formally in the seminal model by Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Shubik (1997), in
the important paper by Zame (1993), in other models mentioned above, and also
in the model constructed in this paper. Moreover, in the model constructed in this
paper, we can directly see the effect of institutional details like exemptions and credit
limits on asset trade, debt recovery, and equilibrium allocations. In computational
models, important insights about the welfare effects of bankruptcy law have been
formalized recently. For example, Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima, and Rios-Rull
(2002) conclude that the welfare gain from eliminating Chapter 7 bankruptcy can
be substantial. In contrast, when production is included in a model with choice
between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 bankruptcy, Li and Sarte (2002) conclude that
eliminating Chapter 7 bankruptcy causes significant declines in both output and
welfare.
The model by Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Shubik (1997) presents important in-
sights about the operation of incomplete competitive markets in the presence of
default. It also formalizes the belief that default is consistent with a smooth func-
tioning of competitive markets. As penalty for default, Dubey, Geanakoplos, and
Shubik (1997) assume that an agent incurs a loss in utility when she defaults, the
loss increasing proportionately in value of default. In their words, utility penalties
are “interpreted as the sum of third party punishment, future (unmodelled) repu-
tation losses, and pangs of conscience” (see page 9 of their paper). However, utility
2The GEI models are based on Radner’s extenstion of the Arrow-Debreu model. (See Radner
(1968), Radner (1972).) For details of the GEI model, see Magill and Quinzii (1996).
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penalties exist in the psyche of the consumer. Such penalties leave the creditor
no legal recourse for debt recovery, they exclude the role of the legal framework in
determining an agent’s choice set, and they rule out any effect of an agent’s default
history on her future access to asset markets. Utility penalties, by subsuming these
relevant economic processes, prevent any analysis of them. In the model constructed
in this paper, there are no direct utility penalties. Instead, some components of the
existing framework of economic and legal processes are abstracted, and their effects
on an agent’s choice environment are formalized.
Also, in a general equilibrium model of bankruptcy, there can be what we may
call a trivial equilibrium — an equilibrium in which agents expect economy-wide
bankruptcy and no recovery on the assets, and hence there is no trade in the assets.
As Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik point out, with pessimistic expectations about
debt recovery, this is a possibly realistic equilibrium. Of course, we also want to
know when there is a non-trivial equilibrium. Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik show
the existence of a non-trivial equilibrium by ruling out the trivial equilibrium. They
rule it out by requiring agents to expect full recovery on each asset in which there is
no trade (or more precisely, on each asset for which the aggregate value of promised
delivery is zero). They motivate this by writing (on page 17), “one can (but need
not) interpret these expectations as if the government guaranteed delivery on the
first infinitesimal promises”. This might not hold when a government is reluctant
or unable to credibly guarantee delivery. Moreover, this expectational refinement
is based on an endogenous variable (value of promised delivery). In the model
constructed in this paper, there is no such expectational refinement, there can be
a trivial equilibrium, and the existence of a non-trivial equilibrium is proved by
making assumptions about the exogenous parameters of the model.
Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Zame (1997) require the seller of an asset to purchase
collateral which can be confiscated if she defaults. To operationalize this, Dubey,
Geanakoplos and Zame treat all goods as durable. At the time of delivery, if an
agent defaults, she loses the undepreciated portion of the collateral. The penalty
of losing the undepreciated value of collateral is economic in nature, and therefore,
it avoids the difficulties of utility penalties. However, in their model, an agent is
never bankrupt. This is because in their model, the amount that an agent has to
repay on her debt is never greater than the value of the undepreciated collateral.
(This also implies that debt recovery from an agent on one claim is insensitive to an
agent’s exposure to other claims.) The creditor has no legal recourse over and above
this value if this value is less than the value of the promised payoff. Since an agent
has to purchase collateral when she sells an asset, she always has enough resources
to repay her debt. Hence, she is never bankrupt. In the model constructed in this
paper, there is bankruptcy. Moreover, it is shown that we can have bankruptcy
without invoking the apparatus of durable goods or securing lending by an already
identified portion of an agent’s income.
Modica, Rustichini, and Tallon (1999) assume that an agent is aware of the
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existence of some states of the world and unaware of others. Each agent plans
only for states of which she is aware, and in such a state her plan accounts for full
payment on all her debts. If a state occurs of which an agent is unaware, and in
this state she has enough resources to repay her debts, she repays her debts fully.
Otherwise, she defaults. Since different agents might be unaware of different states,
an agent expects partial repayment on her holdings of assets even in states of which
she is aware.
Modica, Rustichini and Tallon assume that in a state of which an agent is un-
aware, the maximum penalty for default that a court imposes on her is her income
in that state. In a state of which an agent is aware, they say that an agent re-
pays her debt because “a court could impose large penalties if it discovered that
the agent is bankrupt” (page 261). Suppose this penalty is the same as the one in
a state of which she is unaware. Modica, Rustichini and Tallon assume that the
preference of every agent is strongly monotone and convex. In addition, suppose
there is one agent who has a bounded intertemporal rate of substitution. In this
case if the price of any asset is positive this agent wants to sell an infinite amount of
the asset. Therefore, for asset markets to clear it is necessary that the price of every
asset is zero, which essentially means that asset markets shut down. Thus, in any
equilibrium of such an economy, if the price of any asset is to be positive it must
be that the penalty which a court imposes in a state of which an agent is aware is
larger than the one it imposes in a state of which she is unaware. This implies that
a court is cognizant of which states an agent is aware or unaware. Such cognizance
is implausible because the notion of an agent’s subjective state space is intrinsic to
the agent. Thus, in an important sub-collection of economies represented by their
model, there appears to be an interpretive difficulty.
Araujo and Pascoa (2002) independently propose a model that is close in spirit
to the one constructed in this paper. One difference is that they assume that there
is a fraction such that this fraction of every agent’s income cannot be garnished by
creditors. This implies that the level of exemption of a rich agent can be substan-
tially larger than that of a poor agent. With the fixed level of exemption that we
actually observe, it can be that a very small fraction of the endowment of a poor
individual is garnished and a large fraction of the endowment of a rich individual is
garnished.3 The model constructed in this paper captures this aspect of an exemp-
tion. Another difference is that Araujo and Pascoa assume that assets have nominal
payoffs whereas in the model constructed in this paper, assets have real payoffs.
Moreover, the model by Araujo and Pascoa is limited to two periods, and so it does
not capture the effect of prior default by an agent on her future trading opportunity.
In the model constructed in this paper, these effects are captured fairly generally
by the introduction of credit limits.
3Of course, the largest exemption in bankruptcy law, the homestead exemption, is an example
of a fixed level of exemption.
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The models by Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik, by Dubey, Geanakoplos and
Zame, by Modica, Rustichini and Tallon, and by Araujo and Pascoa all have only two
time periods, and therefore, cannot capture the effect of an agent’s default history
on her future trading opportunity. The earliest such an effect can be captured is in
the third period. The model constructed in this paper has finitely many periods.
In it, the default history of an agent can affect her future trading opportunity in a
fairly general manner.
The construction of the model in this paper, and the proof of existence of an
equilibrium retains much of the flavor of the Arrow-Debreu model and the GEI
model, but the reader will find the following features specific to this model, and to
the proof presented here.
In the model constructed in this paper, in any period and state of the world, if
the excess of an agent’s (gross) income over the value of her exemption is less than
what she owes, the only penalty imposed on her in that period and state is forfeiture
of this excess income. Because her liability is limited to this excess income, an agent
might want to sell an infinite amount of an asset, and this can jeopardize existence
of an equilibrium. To prevent this, the notion of a credit limit is introduced. Such
a limit implies a bound on asset sales, and helps us apply standard techniques to
prove existence of an equilibrium.
In the model constructed in this paper, a credit limit system is exogenous. This
prevents an investigation of endogenously arising credit limits, but helps us under-
stand the welfare effects of differently specified credit limits. As described in more
detail below, other than providing a bound on asset sales, credit limit systems ad-
missible in this model can be fairly general in how they utilize an agent’s default
history.
From a practical point of view, we know that an individual’s ability to sell an
asset and take on debt is restricted by some credit limit.4 The model in this paper
is motivated by anonymous trading of standardized debt contracts in markets for
asset-backed securities. As usual in GEI-models, the collection of assets, including
standardized debt contracts, is exogenously specified. For standard debt contracts
such as credit card debt, (or standard home loans or automobile loans,) a financial
intermediary such as a bank or a finance company estimates an agent’s repayment
ability using standardized criteria, and determines her credit limit. This allows
the agent to sell some amount of a standardized debt contract. The model allows
for finitely many assets, and is flexible enough to incorporate individualized credit
limits, credit limits that depend on some classes of agents, and credit limits that are
independent of agents.
4A practical exogenous bound on asset sales could be motivated by restricting sales of assets so
that promises of delivery of real goods next period are less than aggregate endowment of all goods
in the economy. This would not cover offsetting financial contracts, but is arguably a reasonable
upper bound on short sales.
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In the model, the definition of disposable income implies that the budget set of
an agent can be non-convex. To guarantee that aggregate demand is convex-valued,
it is assumed that the model has a continuum of agents, and their distribution is
atomless.
In the proof of existence of an equilibrium, in addition to an agent’s optimal
choice of a consumption and portfolio plan, it is important to know the loss and debt
information associated with this plan. The demand set is extended to include this
information. Also, in the proof, it is necessary to have a procedure to compute the
default rate from aggregate loss and aggregate debt. A default rate correspondence
is defined to carry out this computation. Both these modifications can jeopardize a
naive adoption of a standard proof of existence of an equilibrium (for example, as
given in Hildenbrand (1974)). Part of what is shown in this paper is that a careful
adoption of a standard proof of existence of an equilibrium is possible even with
these modifications. This shows that in the existence proof in this paper, we may
use intuition similar to that used in a standard proof of existence of an equilibrium.
It also shows the power and adaptability of the standard proof.
To formalize and prove the claims mentioned above, the paper proceeds in the
following manner. In the next section, the model is specified, an economy and an
equilibrium in it are defined, and the main results are stated. In the section after
that, the main results are proved. After that, some welfare effects of bankruptcy
are presented. Finally, some ways in which we may modify and extend the model
are pointed out.
2 Specification of the Model
The model is specified in the following manner. First, the organization of economic
activity in an exchange economy in which there is bankruptcy is outlined. This
helps us understand the role of the relevant economic and legal entities and the
relations among them. Then, some basic concepts are formally introduced. After
that, abstracting some components from the existing legal framework, the rights of
creditors and debtors in the model are formalized. This helps determine the financial
position of an agent in the model. After that, from some trading restrictions that we
observe, a credit limit for an agent in the model is postulated. This helps formalize
the role of credit limits in the model. Finally, a budget set, a demand set, an
economy, and an equilibrium in an economy are defined, and the main results are
stated.
At an elementary level, an individual becomes bankrupt if his choice set includes
plans which entail his becoming bankrupt in some states of the world, and he chooses
such a plan. His choice set might include such plans because of uncertainty, as
well as the legal framework. Uncertainty (about his ability to honor promises of
future delivery of goods) enables an agent to make promises of future delivery of
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goods which, in some states, exceed his ability to honor them. The legal framework
allows him, in some situations, to renege on his promise, and in the provisions of
bankruptcy law, seek protection from creditors. Thus, there is personal bankruptcy
because uncertainty combined with the institutional framework allows plans which
entail bankruptcy in some states of the world to be included in an individual’s choice
environment, and he chooses such a plan.
In an exchange economy in which there is bankruptcy, economic activity might
be organized as follows. There are consumption goods and assets. Agents use assets
to move income among different time periods and among different states of the world
so that they can finance the bundle of consumption goods that they desire most.
One way to move future income to the present is by getting a loan. This is like
selling a promise for future delivery of some good.
When an agent goes to a bank or a credit institution to get a loan, the lenders
never determine his actual ability to repay the loan in every possible state of the
world. Rather, they estimate this ability. They estimate the agent’s future salary,
confirm his employment status, evaluate his default history and determine the risk-
iness of the loan by considering repayment schedules on similar loans to others.
Using standardized criteria they determine an agent’s credit limit. An agent can
get a loan up to his credit limit. In this view, a bank or a credit institution serves
mainly as a check-point that imposes a credit limit constraint on an agent if he
wants to sell a promise for future delivery of some good. As long as an agent’s
promise for future delivery satisfies the constraint imposed by this check-point, he
may sell such promises.
The lenders aggregate these loans to manufacture a composite security, pieces
of which are traded in asset markets.5 An agent purchasing a unit of this asset gets
a slice of the underlying loans and bears the average default risk on them.6
At the time of repayment, creditors have some claim to a debtor’s income. How-
ever, to ensure that the debtor is not left penniless, bankruptcy law provides for
some exemptions.7 A debtor’s income up to the value of these exemptions is ex-
empted from forfeiture even if he has debt outstanding (an abstraction of §522(b)(1)
of Title 11 of the United States Code Annotated). Although creditors cannot reach
into a debtor’s exemptions to recover their money, they have a prior claim to the
5For example, markets in which collateralized mortgage obligations are traded, markets in which
credit card debt is traded, and markets in which car loans are traded.
6In thinking about securitized pools of assets, this paper follows Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Shubik
(1997).
7See §522 of Title 11 of the United States Code Annotated. Examples of exemptions are (some
of the) value of homes, vehicles, retirement accounts, furniture, clothes and other personal property.
White (1998) lists exemptions by state for each state in the United States and for the District of
Columbia. Note that, by §522(e), a debtor cannot contract away his exemptions. As Epstein (1995)
writes on page 177, such a contract is not enforceable.
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excess of a debtor’s income over the value of his exemptions (abstraction of §726). If
an agent’s (gross) income minus his exemptions is sufficient to repay his creditors, he
is required by law to pay his debts fully. From such an agent there is no loss on any
asset and his disposable income is what remains of his income after paying off what
he owes. If an agent’s (gross) income minus his exemptions is insufficient to repay
his creditors, he is bankrupt. From every bankrupt agent the courts confiscate the
excess of his income over his exemptions, determine the loss from him on each asset
based on the method of proportional recovery and discharge his debts (abstractions
of §704, §726-727). The disposable income of each bankrupt agent is the value of
his exemptions.8
Agents use their disposable income to finance their consumption. Total loss on
an asset is the aggregate of loss from each agent on this asset. The ratio of total
loss on an asset to total debt owed on it is the default rate on the asset. Creditors
bear the loss in proportion to their asset holdings.
The model of an exchange economy that is constructed in this paper has the
essential features mentioned above. A natural notion of equilibrium in such an
economy is a collection of prices, default rates and individual plans such that indi-
viduals are optimizing, markets are clearing and the default rate on an asset equals
the ratio of total loss on that asset to total debt owed on it. With this notion of
equilibrium, and using standard assumptions about preferences and endowments,
and using natural assumptions about the rights of creditors and debtors and about
credit limits, it is shown that every economy represented by this model has an
equilibrium.
Let us look at some basic concepts. Partial order on <K , K = 1, 2, . . ., is the
usual one.9 For any ξ ∈ <K , ξ+ denotes the positive part of ξ and is the vector with
k-th component ξk if ξk ≥ 0 and 0 otherwise, and ξ− denotes the negative part of
ξ and is the vector with k-th component −ξk if ξk ≤ 0 and 0 otherwise. Thus, for
any ξ ∈ <K , ξ+ ≥ 0, ξ− ≥ 0 and ξ = ξ+ − ξ−.
The model has a finite number of periods, indexed t = 1, . . . , T , and a finite
number of states, indexed s = 1, . . . , S. Each state s is a particular history of the
environment from period 1 through period T . The events observable in period t are
given by a partition St of {1, . . . , S}. To reflect dependence of actions in period
8The model constructed here abstracts from essential components of bankruptcy under Chapter
7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. According to the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts
(News Release; June 9, 2000), in the last six years, Chapter 7 bankruptcies hovered around 73% of
all personal bankruptcies and personal bankruptcies increased from 94% to 97% of all bankruptcies.
A description of the Bankruptcy Code is given in Epstein (1995), and a quick overview in White
(1998).
9x ≥ y means xk ≥ yk, k = 1, . . . , K; x > y means x ≥ y and x 6= y; x À y means xk > yk, k =
1, . . . , K. For E ⊂ <K , E+ is the set of those elements in E which are greater than or equal to 0.
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t on events observable in that period, let us say that a function on {1, . . . , S} is
St-measurable if it is constant on each event Et ∈ St. To reflect the additional avail-
ability of information as time goes on, it is assumed that the sequence of partitions,
S = (St)Tt=1, is nondecreasing in fineness and call it an information structure.
For t = 1, . . . , T , let Rt =
{
(ξt(s))Ss=1 ∈ <S |ξt(·) is St-measurable
}
be the subspace




The model has a finite number of consumption goods, indexed ` = 1, . . . , L.




Xt. An element x = (xt)Tt=1 ∈ X is a consumption plan which entails
consumption of xt(s)` units of good ` in period t, state s.
The model has a finite number of assets or contracts,10 indexed j = 1, . . . , J .
Their payoff in period t is summarized by a S × J matrix of asset returns, denoted
At. Its sj-th component, denoted At(s)j , specifies the (non-negative) payoff of asset
j in period t, state s in terms of good ` = 1. For convenience, it is assumed that A1
is the zero matrix and to reflect the dependence of asset returns on the information
available, it is assumed that for each t ≥ 2, At(·) is St-measurable. The sequence
of asset return matrices, A = (At)Tt=1, is called an asset structure. Portfolios of
assets are defined as follows. The portfolio space in period t ≤ T − 1 is Zt = RJt




element z = (zt)Tt=1 ∈ Z is a portfolio plan which entails a holding of zt(s)j units
of asset j in period t, state s. Occasionally, we shall run across the notation zt−1,
where t = 1. Whenever we have to consider a portfolio z0, let us use z0 = 0.
Prices of goods and assets are defined as follows. The price space in period
t ≤ T−1 is ∆t =
{
(pt, qt) ∈ (RL+Jt )+
∣
∣ for every s, ∑` pt(s)` +
∑
j qt(s)j = 1
}
, and
that in period t = T is ∆T =
{
(pT , 0) ∈ (RL+JT )+ | for every s,
∑
` pT (s)` = 1
}
.
The price space is ∆ =
T×
t=1
∆t. Each element (p, q) ∈ ∆ is a price system with
pt(s)` the price of a unit of good ` in period t, state s, and qt(s)j the price of a unit
of asset j in period t, state s.
The model has a continuum of agents I = [0, 1], indexed i ∈ I. (I,B, µ) is a
measure space with µ a complete, finite, atomless measure. Each agent i has a
preference relation , ºi ⊂ X×X, which is complete, reflexive, transitive, convex,
continuous, and strongly monotone (x > x́ ⇒ x Âi x́),11 and an endowment
10In this model, assets have long lives. However, it is easy to incorporate in this model assets with
short lives. In fact, if there are only assets with short lives, it is easier to prove some components
of the proof of existence of an equilibrium. Also, all welfare effects given in this paper remain true
even if assets have short lives.
11The notions of indifference (∼i) and strict preference (Âi) are the usual ones.
10
Contributions to Theoretical Economics , Vol. 3 [2003], Iss. 1, Art. 1
Brought to you by | University of Kansas Libraries (University of Kansas Libraries)
Authenticated | 172.16.1.226
Download Date | 3/20/12 8:14 PM
wi = (wit)
T
t=1 ∈ X. It is assumed that the collection of endowments, (wi)i∈I , lies in
a bounded set, it satisfies infi wi À 0, and that the map i 7→ (ºi, wi) is measurable.
These are the basic concepts. Let us now look at the rights of creditors and
debtors in the model and use these to determine the financial position of an agent.
We know that there are laws governing priority of claims of creditors on a debtor’s
income and laws protecting debtors from the claims of creditors. Abstracting some
components from this legal framework, the following is assumed about the decision
making environment of an agent in the model. (1) There is an exemption — that
is, a bundle of goods such that for each good, the value of an agent’s endowment of
this good up to the value of this good in the exemption bundle is exempted from
forfeiture even if he has debts outstanding, (2) a creditor has a prior claim to the
excess of a debtor’s income over the value of the debtor’s exemption, and (3) the
claim of any creditor on an agent’s income has the same priority as the claim of any
other creditor. These assumptions describe the rights of creditors and debtors
in the model.12 The first assumption implies that the exemption value of an agent
is the sum over goods of the minimum of value of his endowment of each good and
the value of this good in the exemption bundle. The second assumption implies that
if the liquidation value of an agent — that is, the excess of his (gross) income over
his exemption value — is greater than the debt he owes, his liability is the debt he
owes. Otherwise, his liability is his liquidation value. The third assumption implies
that creditors share losses from a debtor in proportion to what he owes them. If we
think of unsecured lending as lending which is not secured by an already identified
portion of future income but only by a general claim on it then this model has only
unsecured lending.13
To see an illustration of the notion of a default rate on an asset, suppose that
total loss from agents on this asset is β, and total debt owed by them on this asset
is γ, with 0 ≤ β ≤ γ, and γ > 0. Then, the default rate on this asset is α = βγ , and
recovery rate 1− α. Thus, default rate on an asset in a particular period and state
is a number between 0 and 1 that tells us the proportion of debt which is bad. This
motivates the following notation.
The default rate space in period t = 1 is ∇1 = {0} ⊂ R1 and in period t ≥ 2
is ∇t =
{
αt ∈ RJt | 0 ≤ αt ≤ 1
}
. (Here, 0 is the vector of zeros and 1 the vector of
ones, both in RJt .) The default rate space is ∇ =
T×
t=1
∇t. An element α ∈ ∇ is a
default rate system with αt(s)j the default rate on asset j in period t, state s.
To ensure that in each period and state the value of the exemption is not zero,
it is assumed that an exemption is an element e ∈ X such that e À 0.
Let us now determine the financial position of an agent. Suppose (p, q, α)
is a price and default rate system, and zi a portfolio plan for agent i. In pe-
12A limitation of this model is that it does not allow for renegotiation.
13We can interpret an asset in this model as a reduced form representation of the unsecured
portion of an underlying asset, but this interpretation is not forced.
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riod t, state s, agent i’s endowment income is pt(s)wit(s), he is supposed to re-
ceive pt(s)1[At(s) + qt(s)]zit−1(s)+ from his period t − 1 asset purchases, but ex-
pects to receive only
∑J
j=1(1−αt(s)j)pt(s)1[At(s)j +qt(s)j ](zit−1(s)+)j , and he owes
pt(s)1[At(s) + qt(s)]zit−1(s)−. The gross income of agent i in period t, state
s is the sum of his endowment income and what he expects to receive in that pe-
riod and state. His exemption value in that period and state is εi(p, q, α, zi)t(s) =∑L
`=1 min( pt(s)`w
i
t(s)` , pt(s)`et(s)` ), and his liquidation value in that period
and state is the excess of his gross income over his exemption value. Agent i is
bankrupt in period t, state s if in that period and state his liquidation value
is less than what he owes. His liability in period t, state s is the lesser of his liq-
uidation value in that period and state and what he owes in it. An implication of
these definitions is that if we think of default as a situation in which an agent repays
less than what he owes then, in this model, an agent defaults exactly when he is
bankrupt.14 The net income of agent i in period t, state s is
f i(p, q, α, zi)t(s) = pt(s)wit(s) +
∑
j(1− αt(s)j)pt(s)1[At(s)j + qt(s)j ](zit−1(s)+)j
− pt(s)1[At(s) + qt(s)]zit−1(s)−.
For t = 1 this reduces to p1(s)wi1(s). The disposable income of agent i in
period t, state s is
W i(p, q, α, zi)t(s) = max( f i(p, q, α, zi)t(s) , εi(p, q, α, zi)t(s) ).
For t = 1 this reduces to p1(s)wi1(s). It is trivial to check that agent i is bankrupt in
period t, state s, if and only if f i(p, q, α, zi)t(s) < εi(p, q, α, zi)t(s). In this case, his
disposable income is εi(p, q, α, zi)t(s), and he contributes (ε − f)i(p, q, α, zi)t(s) =
εi(p, q, α, zi)t(s) − f i(p, q, α, zi)t(s) to the pool of bad debts. Otherwise, he con-
tributes nothing to the pool of bad debts. The loss from agent i in period t,
state s is λi(p, q, α, zi)t(s) = max((ε − f)i(p, q, α, zi)t(s), 0). The debt owed by
agent i on asset j in period t, state s is γi(p, q, α, zi)t(s)j = pt(s)1[At(s)j +
qt(s)j ](zit−1(s)−)j . The ratio of loss from agent i in a period and state to what he
owes in it is the proportion of his debt that creditors cannot recover. Therefore, the
loss from agent i on asset j is this proportion of what he owes on asset j. Formally,
the loss from agent i on asset j in period t, state s is





γi(p, q, α, zi)t(s)j if pt(s)1[At(s) + qt(s)]zit−1(s)− > 0
0 otherwise.
Notice that for t = 1, βi(p, q, α, zi)1(s)j = γi(p, q, α, zi)1(s)j = 0.
14This does not mean that he has no choice about whether to default or not. He still controls his
portfolio choice which affects his bankruptcy status and hence his default status.
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This summarizes the financial position of an agent in the model. Let us now
look at trading restrictions, and how these limit the ability of an agent to take on
debt.
From a practical point of view, we know that an individual’s ability to sell an
asset and take on debt is restricted by some credit limit. In the model, a bound
on an agent’s ability to sell an asset is important, because with a positive asset
price, debt obligation limited by exemption value and no bound on asset sales, there
are many cases in which an agent wants to sell an infinite amount of the asset.15
Therefore, for asset markets to clear it is necessary that the price of every asset be
zero, which essentially means that asset markets shut down. A credit limit implies
a bound on asset sales. It is this property of a credit limit that is abstracted and
formalized.
We know that a credit limit which an individual faces depends, among other
things, on an estimate of his ability to deliver the goods, on his default history,






there is p ∈ RL+ and (p, q) ∈ ∆
}
, and for every j, s, t with
t ≤ T − 1, let Qt(s)j =
{
q ∈ Q ∣qt(s)j ≥ 12J
}
. A credit limit for agent i is a
continuous function Ci : Q×RJ+ →RJ+ (mapping (q, β) to Ci(q, β)) that is weakly
decreasing in β.17 To reflect the dependence of a credit limit on the information
available in a particular period, it is assumed that for every t, Ci(q, β)t depends
only on qt′ and βt′ where t′ ≤ t. A credit limit system is a map C : i 7→ Ci.
It is assumed that this map is measurable,18 that Ci evaluated at β = 0 when
viewed as a function of i and q is bounded, and that for every j, s, t with t ≤





i(q, β)t(s)j > 0
}
) > 0, and if qt(s)j = 0 then
µ(
{
i ∈ I ∣Ci(q, 0)t(s)j = 0
}
) = µ(I).
The last two assumptions are useful in proving the main results in this paper. We
can think of these assumptions in the following manner. The last assumption says
that if in a particular period and state, the price of an asset is zero then, regardless
of his default history, almost no agent can sell this asset. Of course, if the price of
an asset is zero, and if an agent selling this asset has to deliver something on this
asset he will choose not to sell the asset, and this assumption is superfluous. This
assumption is useful in the case when, even though the price of an asset is zero,
an agent is indifferent between selling or not selling the asset. This happens if the
agent is not required to deliver anything on the asset, or if he is bankrupt in the
15For example, every agent with strongly monotone and convex preferences who has a bounded
intertemporal rate of substitution wants to sell an infinite amount of the asset.
16The price of an asset will reflect the riskiness of the asset.
17β ≤ β́ ⇒ Ci(·, β́) ≤ Ci(·, β)).
18The target space is, of course, the space of closed subsets of Q × RJ+ × RJ+ along with the
sigma-algebra generated by the topology of closed convergence.
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next period. In this situation, the last assumption implies that the agent does not
sell the asset.
The assumption before the last one says that, in a particular period and state,
if the price of an asset is bounded away from zero, then there are some agents who,
regardless of their default history, can sell this asset. This captures the idea that a
credit limit for an agent looks not just to the past but also to the future. It looks
to the future in the sense that there are some agents who, even though they have a
bad default history, will have some money in the next period, and hence are allowed
to undertake some promises of future delivery.
In this model, it is assumed that a credit limit system is exogenous. It would
be more satisfying to endogenize this by postulating an abstract credit limit agency
which determines the credit limit of an agent as the result of an optimization pro-
cedure. At the very least, we might expect this procedure to assign a smaller credit
limit to an agent when (expected) loss from this agent is higher in future periods.
However, as an example given below shows, creditors might prefer debtors to have
more debt even when they expect debtors to cause them greater (expected) losses
in the future. This shows that the notion of an optimal credit limit depends on the
characteristics of agents. Keeping credit limits exogenous allows us to see the effect
of different credit limits on equilibrium outcomes.
Also, in the model, it is assumed that agents can have individualized credit lim-
its. This does not mean that agents lose their trading anonymity. At most, they
lose their anonymity to a credit-setting financial intermediary like a bank, a bro-
kerage house or some other lending institution. Just like they lose their anonymity
to a settlement system which allocates a bankrupt agent’s income among his credi-
tors. In the model in this paper, (and to an extent in the other models mentioned
above,) these intermediaries are abstracted away because they are assumed to play
a passive and standardized role in the economy. This allows us to focus on the
trading and allocative aspects of competitive markets. Once credit limits for agents
are determined, (intuitively, by financial intermediaries using standardized criteria
in a passive manner,) and a settlement system is in place, these agents can trade
anonymously through markets.
Of course, it is easy and obvious to see that the model in this paper can be
modified so that credit limits are independent of agents. This also implies that in
determining a credit limit for an agent, we use some measure of loss independent of
particular agents (for example, we can use aggregate loss). Slightly more generally,
depending on some characteristics of agents, we can partition the agents into a few
classes, and for agents in each class, use their aggregate loss to determine their credit
limit. Some other modifications and extensions of this model are given in the last
section of this paper.
Using the definition of a credit limit, the notion that an agent sells assets subject
to a check-point authorization is formalized in the following definition of admissi-
bility of a portfolio plan. Let (p, q, α) be a price and default rate system, and Ci a
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credit limit for agent i. A portfolio plan zi is (Ci, p, q, α)- admissible if for every
j, s, t with t ≤ T − 1,
if there is s′ ∈ Et(s) with At+1(s′)j > 0,
then At+1(s)j(zit(s)−)j ≤ Ci(q, βi(p, q, α, zi))t(s)j ,
otherwise (zit(s)−)j ≤ Ci(q, βi(p, q, α, zi))t(s)j .
Here, Et(s) is the event in St which contains s, and βi(p, q, α, zi) is the profile of
loss from agent i on every asset in every period and state. The concept of admis-
sibility formalizes the idea that an agent’s ability to take on debt depends, among
other things, on an agent-specific component which includes his default history, and
on the price of the asset which reflects the riskiness of the asset. Using portfolio
admissibility, a bound on asset sales follows immediately.
Lemma 1. Let C be a credit limit system. Then there is ẑ ∈ Z such that for every
price and default rate system (p, q, α), every agent i, every (Ci, p, q, α)-admissible
zi, every period t ≤ T − 1, state s and asset j, (zit(s)−)j ≤ ẑt(s)j.
Proof. Let ẑ be given by ẑt(s)j =
supi,q C
i(q,0)t(s)j
max{At+1(s′)j | s′∈Et(s)} if there is s
′ ∈ Et(s) such
that At+1(s′)j > 0 and ẑt(s)j = supi,q Ci(q, 0)t(s)j otherwise. Suppose (p, q, α), i,
and zi are as in the hypothesis. Fix j, s and t ≤ T − 1 arbitrarily. If for every
s′ ∈ Et(s), At+1(s′)j = 0, then (zit(s)−)j obviously satisfies the desired inequal-
ity. Otherwise, let ŝ ∈ Et(s) be such that At+1(ŝ)j = max {At+1(s′)j | s′ ∈ Et(s)}.
Then, since zit(·) and Ci(q, 0)t(·) are St-measurable and since Et(ŝ) = Et(s), we have
At+1(ŝ)j(zit(s)−)j = At+1(ŝ)j(z
i
t(ŝ)−)j ≤ Ci(q, 0)t(ŝ)j = Ci(q, 0)t(s)j ,
from which the desired conclusion follows.
We can now easily comprehend what a budget set for an agent will be like in this
model. An agent’s budget set consists of all consumption and (admissible) portfolio
plans which are affordable. His demand set consists of those plans in the budget
set which are optimal with respect to his preference relation. Formally, let C be a
credit limit system, and (p, q, α) a price and default rate system. For an agent i, a
consumption and portfolio plan (xi, zi) is (p, q, α)-affordable if in every period t
and state s, pt(s)xit(s) + qt(s)z
i
t(s) ≤ W i(p, q, α, zi)t(s). It is strictly affordable if
the inequality is strict. The budget set for agent i is
Bi(p, q, α) =
{
(xi, zi) ∈ X × Z
∣
∣ (xi, zi) is (p, q, α)-affordable, and
zi is (Ci, p, q, α)-admissible
}
.
The demand set for agent i is
Di(p, q, α) =
{
(xi, zi) ∈ Bi(p, q, α) ∣(x́i, źi) ∈ Bi(p, q, α) ⇒ xi ºi x́i } .
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It is easy to see that Bi(p, q, α) is compact if and only if p À 0 and qt À 0 (for
t ≤ T − 1); if Bi(p, q, α) is compact then Di(p, q, α) is not empty; and if Di(p, q, α)
is not empty then p À 0. It is also easy to see that the definition of disposable
income implies that the budget set can be non-convex.19
We now have all the components to define an economy, and an equilibrium in it.
An economy represented by this model is a collection
{S, A, (ºi, wi)i∈I , e, C
}
,
where S = (St)Tt=1 is an information structure, A = (At)Tt=1 is an asset structure,
(ºi, wi) is the preference relation and endowment of agent i, e is an exemption,
and C is a credit limit system. An equilibrium in an economy is a collection
(p, q, α; (xi, zi)i∈I) where (p, q, α) is a price and default rate system, and
• for almost every i ∈ I, (xi, zi) ∈ Di(p, q, α),
























i(p, q, α, zi)t(s)jdi = 0.
The first condition requires equilibrium consumption and portfolio plans to be op-
timal for almost every agent. The second condition requires markets for goods and
assets to clear. The third condition requires the equilibrium default rate on an as-
set to equal the ratio of total loss on that asset to total debt owed on it, if total
debt owed on it is not zero. If total debt owed is zero, the default rate can be any
number between zero and one.20 The main results in this paper are the following
two theorems.
Theorem 1. With the stated assumptions, every economy represented by
this model has an equilibrium.
One way to prove this theorem is by setting, for every s and every t ≤ T −
1, qt(s) = 0 and αt+1(s) = 1, and by setting, for every i, zi = 0. Then asset
markets are closed in every period so that, in essence, we have a finite collection of
sub-economies (each with one period and L consumption goods) without any asset
markets connecting them. The standard proof of existence of an equilibrium (as
19This non-convexity remains even if we view purchases and sales of assets as belonging to different
spaces.
20It is clear that if total debt owed on any asset in any period t, state s is zero and the market
for that asset clears then the value of αt(s)j is irrelevant.
16
Contributions to Theoretical Economics , Vol. 3 [2003], Iss. 1, Art. 1
Brought to you by | University of Kansas Libraries (University of Kansas Libraries)
Authenticated | 172.16.1.226
Download Date | 3/20/12 8:14 PM
in an Arrow-Debreu economy) also shows that this economy has an equilibrium.
However, such an equilibrium is trivial. Formally, an equilibrium (p, q, α; (xi, zi)i∈I)
in an economy is trivial if for every s and every t ≤ T − 1, either qt(s) = 0 or
αt+1(s) = 1. The proof of existence of an equilibrium that presented in this paper
also yields the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Every economy in which for some j, s, t, et(s) < infi wit(s) and
At(s)j > 0 has a non-trivial equilibrium.
3 Existence of Equilibrium
The two theorems mentioned above are proved as follows. First, the price space is
truncated so that prices are bounded away from zero. Then, the relevant information
in the economy is summarized in a correspondence on a space which depends on
the truncated price space. By Kakutani’s theorem, this correspondence has a fixed
point. As the truncated price space approaches the untruncated space, there is a
sequence of fixed points. From this sequence we get a convergent subsequence, the
limit of which gives us an equilibrium.
Let us truncate the price space as follows. For n ≥ L + J and n 6= ∞, the
n-truncated price space in period t ≤ T − 1 is ∆̂n,t =
{
(pt, qt) ∈ ∆t
∣
(pt, qt) ≥ 1n1
}
,
(here, 1 is the vector of ones in RL+Jt ,) and in period t = T is
∆̂n,T =
{




(here, 1 is the vector of ones in RLT ). The n-




The correspondence that summarizes the relevant information in the economy
is a product of three correspondences. The first correspondence is the aggregate
extended demand correspondence — it relates market variables (price and default
rate) to aggregate individual choices (aggregate demand and the corresponding total
loss and total debt). The second correspondence is the price correspondence — it
relates possible levels of excess demand to prices. The third correspondence is the
default rate correspondence — it relates possible levels of total loss and total debt
to default rates associated with them.
First, let us look at the aggregate extended demand correspondence, and some
of its properties. As a preliminary step, let us look at the demand correspondence.
The demand correspondence for agent i associates to every (p, q, α) in ∆ × ∇ the
set Di(p, q, α). Let P0 = {(p, q) ∈ ∆ | for some s, t, pt(s) = 0}. Then we have the
following lemma.
Lemma 2. For every i, the demand correspondence for agent i has closed graph on
(∆ \ P0)×∇.
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Proof. Suppose (pm, qm, αm, xim, z
i
m) → (p, q, α, xi, zi), (pm, qm) and (p, q) not in
P0, and (xim, z
i
m) ∈ Di(pm, qm, αm). We need to verify that (xi, zi) ∈ Di(p, q, α). It
is easy to see that (xi, zi) ∈ Bi(p, q, α). So suppose (x́i, źi) ∈ Bi(p, q, α). We want
to conclude that xi ºi x́i.
Fix ξ ∈ (0, 1) arbitrarily. Let us first confirm that for all m sufficiently large,
(ξx́i, ξzi) ∈ Bi(pm, qm, αm). Since for every s, t, ξf i(p, q, α, źi)t(s) < f i(p, q, α, ξzi)t(s)
and ξεi(p, q, α, źi)t(s) < εi(p, q, α, ξzi)t(s), (ξx́i, ξzi) is strictly affordable at (p, q, α).
Thus, there is m0 such that m ≥ m0 implies that (ξx́i, ξzi) is (pm, qm, αm)-affordable.
To check for admissibility, temporarily fix j, s, t with t ≤ T − 1. Suppose there is
s′ ∈ Et(s) such that At+1(s′)j > 0. If either (zit(s)−)j = 0 or At+1(s)j = 0 then
At+1(s)j((ξzi)t(s)−)j = 0 otherwise At+1(s)j((ξzi)t(s)−)j < Ci(q, βi(p, q, α, ξzi))t(s)j .
In either case, there is mt(s)j ≥ m0 such that m ≥ mt(s)j implies




Now, suppose that for every s′ ∈ Et(s) At+1(s′)j = 0. If (zit(s)−)j = 0, then
((ξzi)t(s)−)j = 0, otherwise ((ξzi)t(s)−)j < Ci(q, βi(p, q, α, ξzi))t(s)j . In either
case we may choose mt(s)j ≥ m0 such that m ≥ mt(s)j also implies that
((ξzi)t(s)−)j ´≤ Ci(qm, βi(pm, qm, αm, ξzi))t(s)j .
´
´ ´
Therefore, ξzi satisfies the admissibility constraint for this j, s, t. This implies that
for m ≥ maxj,s,t mt(s)j , ξzi is (Ci, pm, qm, αm)-admissible, and hence (ξx́i, ξzi) ∈
Bi(pm, qm, αm).
From the optimality of xim and the continuity of ºi we conclude that xi ºi x́i,
as desired.
To define the aggregate extended demand correspondence, the concept of an ex-
tended demand set is utilized. The extended demand set extends the demand set
to incorporate information on loss and debt associated with an optimal consump-
tion and portfolio plan. Formally, let (p, q, α) be a price and default rate system.
Fix n ≥ 1. Let zi be a portfolio plan for agent i. Define γ̂in(p, q, α, zi)t(s)j =
max(γi(p, q, α, zi)t(s)j , 1n), and β̂
i
n(p, q, α, z
i)t(s)j by replacing γi(p, q, α, zi)t(s)j in
the definition of βi(p, q, α, zi)t(s)j by γ̂in(p, q, α, z
i)t(s)j . For n = ∞, the definition
remains the same, but with the convention that 1∞ = 0. For n ≥ 1, including n = ∞,
the n-extended demand set for agent i is









(xi, zi) ∈ Di(p, q, α),
and for every j, s, t,
β̂it(s)j = β̂
i










To every (p, q, α) in ∆ × ∇, the n-extended demand correspondence for agent i
associates the n-extended demand set Din(p, q, α), and the n-aggregate extended
demand correspondence associates the set
∫
I Din(p, q, α)di.
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From the previous lemma, it is easy to see that for each n, including n = ∞, Din
has closed graph on (∆\P0)×∇. In addition to this, if a price and default rate sys-
tem (p, q, α) satisfies p À 0 and qt À 0 (for t ≤ T−1), then Din is uniformly bounded
(over i) on a neighborhood of (p, q, α) so that by Proposition D.II.8 in Hildenbrand
(1974) (p.73),
∫
I Din(p, q, α)di has closed graph at (p, q, α). Also, because the mea-
sure on agents is atomless,
∫
I Din(p, q, α)di is a convex subset of X ×Z ×RJ+×RJ+.






n) → (p, q, α, xi, zi, βi, γi)






n) ∈ Din(pn, qn, αn), then
(xi, zi, βi, γi) ∈ Di∞(p, q, α).21 The role of the aggregate extended demand corre-
spondence is to aggregate individual demand and the associated loss and debt to
yield the aggregate demand and the corresponding aggregate loss and aggregate
debt in the economy.
Second, let us look at the price correspondence and some of its properties. Con-
sider, for a fixed aggregate demand in period t, the function which assigns to each
price in period t the value of excess demand. Formally, for every n ≥ L + J and
n 6= ∞, every t, and every (xt, zt) ∈ Xt × Zt, let vt(xt, zt) : ∆̂n,t → Rt be given





n-price correspondence in period t, θn,t : Xt × Zt → ∆̂n,t, is given by (xt, zt) 7→{
(pt, qt) ∈ ∆̂n,t |(pt, qt) ∈ argmax vt(xt, zt)
}
. The n-price correspondence , Θn :
X × Z → ∆̂n, associates to each (x, z) the set
T×
t=1
θn,t(xt, zt). To see that for every
n ≥ L + J and n 6= ∞, the n-price correspondence has closed graph and takes
non-empty and convex values in a compact set, it is sufficient to state a fact that is
easy to prove — for every such n and for every t, θn,t has closed graph and takes
non-empty and convex values in a compact set. The role of the price correspon-
dence is the same as that of its counterpart in the Arrow-Debreu economy. In the
words of Debreu (1959) (p.83), the price correspondence “prompts one, when trying
to reduce positive excess demands, to put the weight of the price system on those
commodities for which the excess demand is the greatest.”
Third, let us look at the default rate correspondence and some of its properties.
Fix n ≥ 1 and n 6= ∞. For each (β, γ) ∈ <+ × <+ let γ̂n = max(γ, 1n) and let
φn(β, γ) =
{










if γ > 0,
{1} if γ = 0 and β > 0,
[0, 1] if γ = 0 and β = 0.
Then, for every n ≥ 1 and n 6= ∞, φn is a continuous correspondence with non-
empty, compact and convex values. Also, it is easy to see that φ∞ has closed




) then γ̂n → γ ⇔ γn → γ.
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graph and takes non-empty, compact and convex values. For every n, including
n = ∞, the n-default rate correspondence in period t = 1, φn,1 : (RJ1 )+ × (RJ1 )+ →
∇1, is the correspondence which is identically zero, and in period t ≥ 2, φn,t :
(RJt )+×(RJt )+ → ∇t, is the correspondence which associates to each (βt, γt) the set
×
j,s
φn(βt(s)j , γt(s)j). The n-default rate correspondence, Φn : RJ+ × RJ+ → ∇,




From the properties of φn, it follows that for every n, Φn has closed graph and
takes non-empty, compact and convex values. As in the case of the n-extended
demand correspondence, it is easy to see that for any sequence (βn, γn, αn) ∈ RJ+ ×
RJ+ × ∇, if (βn, γn, αn) → (β, γ, α) and αn ∈ Φn(βn, γn), then α ∈ Φ∞(β, γ). The
role of the default rate correspondence is to use aggregate loss and debt in the
economy to compute the default rate.
These three correspondences summarize the relevant information in the economy.
To ensure that the demand correspondence takes non-empty values, and that we are
working with a compact and convex space, let us check that for any fixed n ≥ L+J
and n 6= ∞, when prices and default rates are in ∆̂n ×∇, the actions of agents and
the integrals of these actions lie in a fixed, non-empty, compact and convex subset
of a Euclidean space, independent of elements in ∆̂n ×∇.
The bound on asset sales shows that the set of admissible portfolios is bounded
below independent of i, independent of prices in ∆̂n, independent of α, and indepen-
dent of n (n 6= ∞). Also, since asset prices are strictly positive, the set of affordable
portfolios is bounded above. Since individual endowments lie in a bounded set, this
bound can be taken independent of i. Thus, the set of affordable and admissible
portfolio plans and their integrals lies in a non-empty, compact, convex set Ẑn ⊂ Z
which is bounded below independent of n.
By definition, the set of consumption plans is bounded below by 0. Since indi-
vidual endowments lie in a bounded set, and the set of affordable portfolio plans is
bounded (independent of i, (p, q) ∈ ∆̂n and α), the set of affordable consumption
plans is bounded above (independent of i, (p, q) ∈ ∆̂n and α). Thus, the set of af-
fordable consumption plans and their integrals lies in a non-empty, compact, convex
set X̂n ⊂ X which is bounded below by 0.
Also, by definition, loss from any agent is bounded below by 0. Since the set
of affordable portfolio plans is bounded below, (independent of i, (p, q) ∈ ∆̂n and
α,) loss from any agent is bounded above (independent of i, (p, q) ∈ ∆̂n and α).
Thus, potential loss from agents and potential aggregate loss in the economy lie in a
non-empty, compact, convex set R̂n ⊂ RJ which is bounded below by 0. Similarly,
potential debt owed to agents and potential aggregate debt in the economy lie in
a non-empty, compact, convex subset of RJ . If necessary, let us replace R̂n by a
larger compact, convex subset of RJ that is bounded below by zero to conclude that
potential debt owed to any agent and potential aggregate debt in the economy also
lie in R̂n.
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To summarize, for n ≥ (L + J) and n 6= ∞, on ∆̂n × ∇, the set of individual
consumption and portfolio plans and their integrals lies in X̂n × Ẑn and the set of
potential loss, potential debt, and their integrals lies in R̂n × R̂n.
Consider the correspondence Ψn on ∆̂n × ∇ × X̂n × Ẑn × R̂n × R̂n given by
Ψn = Ψ1n × Ψ2n × Ψ3n, where, Ψ1n : ∆̂n × ∇ → X̂n × Ẑn × R̂n × R̂n is given by
Ψ1n(p, q, α) =
∫
I Din(p, q, α)di, Ψ2n : X̂n × Ẑn → ∆̂n is given by Ψ2n(x, z) = Θn(x, z),
and Ψ3n : R̂n × R̂n → ∇ is given by Ψ3n(β, γ) = Φn(β, γ). The properties of the
three correspondences given earlier imply that Ψn satisfies the hypotheses of
Kakutani’s theorem. For each n ≥ L+J and n 6= ∞, let (pn, qn, αn, xn, zn, β̂n, γ̂n)
be a fixed point of Ψn. Let us check that we can get a convergent subsequence
from this sequence of fixed points, and the limit of this subsequence gives us an
equilibrium.
Obviously, (pn, qn, αn) is a bounded sequence. As
(xn, zn, β̂n, γ̂n) ∈
∫
I Din(pn, qn, αn)di, there exists, for almost every i, (xin, zin) ∈













Here, (β̂in)t(s)j is short for β̂
i






n(pn, qn, αn, z
i
n)t(s)j .
To see that (xn, zn, β̂n, γ̂n) is bounded, let us use the following lemma.
Lemma 3. (xn, zn) is a bounded sequence.
Proof. Let ζin = x
i




ndi. Then, it is sufficient to check that
(ζn, zn) is a bounded sequence. As ζin ≥ −(supi wi) and zin ≥ −ẑ, ζin and zin are
uniformly (for almost every i) bounded below, (ζn, zn) is bounded below. For upper
bounds, we can use induction on {1, . . . , T} as follows;
Step 1: t = 1. We want to see that, for every s, ((ζn)1(s), (zn)1(s)) is bounded

















n , · · · , 1n ; 1n , · · · , 1n). Then,











Thus, (ζn)1(s)1 is bounded above. Using the same argument with different indices
we see that, for every `, j, (ζn)1(s)` and (zn)1(s)j are bounded above. Since s is
arbitrary, step 1 is complete.
Step 2: Induction. Suppose that for every s, ((ζn)t−1(s), (zn)t−1(s)) is bounded
above. We want to see that for every s, ((ζn)t(s), (zn)t(s)) is bounded above. Notice
that the disposable income in period t, state s, of almost every agent satisfies
W i(pn, qn, αn, zin)t(s) ≤ (pn)t(s)wit(s) + [At(s) + (qn)t(s)](zin)t−1(s)+.
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n)t) ∈ ∆̂n,t, and for every s,
(p′n)t(s)(ζn)t(s) + (q
′






















Thus, (ζn)t(s)1 is bounded above. Using the same argument with different indices
we see that, for every `, j, (ζn)t(s)` and (zn)t(s)j are bounded above. Since s is
arbitrary, step 2 is complete.
From the boundedness of (xn, zn), we can deduce that (β̂n, γ̂n) is a bounded
sequence. Therefore, the sequence (pn, qn, αn, xn, zn, β̂n, γ̂n) is bounded. Replacing
this sequence with a convergent subsequence, suppose that this sequence converges
to (p, q, α, x, z, β, γ). The next lemma implies that p À 0.









i ∈ I ∣for all `, s, t, supn(xin)t(s)` < ∞
}
.
Then µ(F1 ∩ F2) = µ(I). Fix s, t arbitrarily. Then it is sufficient to prove that
(pn)t(s) is bounded away from 0.
Suppose (pn)t(s) → 0. Then, because ‖((pn)t(s), (qn)t(s))‖1 = 1, it must be
that t ≤ T − 1, and also that there is j and a (relabelled) subsequence such that
for all n, (qn)t(s)j ≥ 12J . Therefore, F3 =
{
i ∈ I ∣infn Ci(qn, βn)t(s)j > 0
}
satisfies
µ(F3) > 0. This implies that F1∩F2∩F3 is not empty. For each i in this intersection,
agent i can buy one unit more of each good in period t, state s by giving up an
arbitrarily small amount of consumption in period t+1, state s. But then, by strong
monotonicity and continuity, for all n sufficiently large, we get a contradiction to
(xin, z
i
n) ∈ Di(pn, qn, αn). Therefore, (pn)t(s) 6→ 0. In this case the income of almost
every agent is bounded away from zero. Using the same argument as in the standard
Arrow-Debreu model, we conclude that (pn)t(s) is bounded away from 0 as desired.
This lemma implies that p À 0. Combined with the fact (see proof of the follow-

















n ) is a uniformly bounded (for almost ev-
ery i) and uniformly integrable sequence so that, using Lemma D.II.3 in Hildenbrand
(1974) (p.69), we conclude that there is an integrable function (x́i, źi, β́i, γ́i)i∈I such
that, for almost every i,
(x́i, źi, β́i, γ́i) ∈ Lsn(xin, zin, β̂in, γ̂in) and
∫
I
(x́i, źi, β́i, γ́i)di = (x, z, β, γ).
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erties of the n-extended demand correspondence, we conclude that (x́i, źi, β́i, γ́i) ∈
Di∞(p, q, α) from which it follows that for almost every i there exists (xi, zi) ∈
Di(p, q, α) such that (xi, zi, βi, γi) = (x́i, źi, β́i, γ́i) and
∫
I(x
i, zi, βi, γi)di = (x, z, β, γ).
Let us check that (p, q, α; (xi, zi)i∈I) is an equilibrium. Since, for almost every i,
(xi, zi) ∈ Di(p, q, α), the first condition in the definition of equilibrium is satisfied.
To see that the second and third conditions in the definition of equilibrium are
satisfied, let us use the following lemma.
Lemma 5. For every t ≤ T − 1 and every j, s, ζt(s) = 0, zt(s) = 0, and
αt+1(s)jγt+1(s)j = βt+1(s)j. For t = T and every s, ζT (s) = 0 and zT (s) = 0.
Proof. Let us use induction on {1, . . . , T − 1} as follows;
Step 1: t = 1. We want to see that, for every j, s, ζ1(s) = 0, z1(s) = 0, and
α2(s)jγ2(s)j = β2(s)j . Fix s arbitrarily. From Lemma 3, we see that ζ1(s) ≤ 0 and
z1(s) ≤ 0.







Combined with p1(s) À 0, q1(s) ≥ 0, ζ1(s) ≤ 0, and z1(s) ≤ 0, we have ζ1(s) = 0,
and for every j, if q1(s)j > 0 then z1(s)j = 0. Also, if q1(s)j = 0 then for almost








1(s)jdi ≤ z1(s)j ≤ 0.
To deduce that for every j, α2(s)jγ2(s)j = β2(s)j , notice that 0 ≤ β2(s)j ≤
γ2(s)j . Therefore, if γ2(s)j = 0, then α2(s)jγ2(s)j = β2(s)j . Otherwise, α2(s)j ∈





. Since s is arbitrary, step 1 is complete.
Step 2: Induction. Suppose that for every j, s, ζt−1(s) = 0, zt−1(s) = 0,
and αt(s)jγt(s)j = βt(s)j . We want to see that for every j, s, ζt(s) = 0, zt(s) =
0, and αt+1(s)jγt+1(s)j = βt+1(s)j . Fix s arbitrarily. Let ((p′n)t(s), (q′n)t(s)) =
(n−(L+J−1)n ,
1
n , · · · , 1n ; 1n , · · · , 1n). Then, by Ψ2n, we have,
(p′n)t(s)(ζn)t(s) + (q′n)t(s)(zn)t(s)
≤ ∫I W i(pn, qn, αn, zin)t(s)− (pn)t(s)wit(s)di
=
∫









I(pn)t(s)1[At(s)j + (qn)t(s)j ]((z
i
n)t−1(s)+)jdi ]




+ [1− (αn)t(s)j ](pn)t(s)1[At(s)j + (qn)t(s)j ](zn)t−1(s)j .
It follows that ζt(s)1 = limn(ζn)t(s)1 ≤ 0. Using the same argument with different
indices we see that ζt(s) ≤ 0 and zt(s) ≤ 0.
Analogous to step 1, we have pt(s) À 0, qt(s) ≥ 0, ζt(s) ≤ 0, zt(s) ≤ 0, pt(s)ζt(s)+








t(s)−)jdi = 0. Thus,
ζt(s) = 0 and zt(s) = 0. As in step 1, we see that for every j, 0 ≤ βt+1(s)j ≤ γt+1(s)j ,
and that αt+1(s)jγt+1(s)j = βt+1(s)j . Since s is arbitrary, step 2 is complete. Fi-
nally, the argument showing ζt(s) = 0 and zt(s) = 0 also works for t = T .
23
Sabarwal: Competitive Equilibria, Incomplete Markets, Endogenous Bankruptcy
Brought to you by | University of Kansas Libraries (University of Kansas Libraries)
Authenticated | 172.16.1.226
Download Date | 3/20/12 8:14 PM
This lemma implies that the second and third conditions in the definition of
equilibrium are also satisfied. Therefore, (p, q, α; (xi, zi)i∈I) is an equilibrium. To
see that the second theorem is true, let us use the following lemma.
Lemma 6. Suppose there is s, t such that et(s) < infi wit(s). Then for every j,
αt(s)j < 1.
Proof. Since pn is bounded away from zero, (pn)t(s)(infi wit(s) − et(s)) is also
bounded away from zero. Let 0 < δ < 1 be such that for all n, (pn)t(s)(infi wit(s)−
et(s)) ≥ δ. Then λ(pn, qn, αn, zin)t(s) ≤ max( (pn)t(s)1[At(s)+(qn)t(s)](zin)t−1(s)− −
δ, 0) and for every n such that the denominator of the following fraction is not zero,
max((pn)t(s)1[At(s) + (qn)t(s)](zin)t−1(s)− − δ, 0)
(pn)t(s)1[At(s) + (qn)t(s)](zin)t−1(s)−




where κ = supn(pn)t(s)1[At(s) + (qn)t(s)]ẑt−1(s) + 1. Therefore, for every j, almost
every i and every n ≥ L+J , (β̂in)t(s)j ≤ (1− δκ)(γ̂in)t(s)j whence αt(s)j ≤ 1− δκ .
Now suppose there is j, s, t such that et(s) < infi wit(s) and At(s)j > 0. Then
t ≥ 2 and αt(s)j < 1 so that if qt−1(s)j = 0 then the demand set of almost every
agent is empty which contradicts the definition of an equilibrium. Thus, qt−1(s) > 0,
αt(s) < 1 and the equilibrium is non-trivial.
4 Welfare Effects of Bankruptcy
In this section, using examples of economies represented by the model in this paper,
we shall see some welfare effects of bankruptcy. As mentioned in the introduction of
this paper, these welfare effects are well-known in the legal and economics literature.
In the general equilibrium framework, many welfare effects of default are already
given in Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Shubik (1997), in the important paper by Zame
(1993), in Shubik and Wilson (1977), in Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Zame (1997), and
in Araujo and Pascoa (2002). In contrast to Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Shubik (1997),
the model in this paper explicitly incorporates observable penalties for default into
an agent’s trading environment. Thus, it is useful to know that these welfare effects
can also be seen in economies represented by this model.
We shall see these welfare effects by considering two examples, each of which
has several versions. In this section, to notationally distinguish an equilibrium in
the model in this paper from an equilibrium in other models, let us refer to an
equilibrium in this model as a Bankruptcy equilibrium.
In the first example, we shall see that an asset market which is useless in the GEI
model can become useful when we allow for bankruptcy, that every equilibrium in
the Bankruptcy model can be at least as good as the equilibrium in the GEI model,
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and that a Bankruptcy equilibrium can pareto dominate a GEI equilibrium. We
shall also see the effects of different levels of exemptions on equilibrium outcomes.
If exemptions are too large, there is no possibility of debt recovery, and hence no
trade in the asset.
The intuition for these results is that a creditor is willing to lend money to
a debtor if the debtor repays her debt in the state in which the creditor likes to
consume even though she is bankrupt in the other state. Also, default rates change
the return on an asset; this changes the asset span, and can make the asset more
useful. Therefore, the institution of bankruptcy allows agents to effectively create a
new asset that can lead to a pareto improving equilibrium.
In the second example, we shall see that a pareto optimal Bankruptcy equilib-
rium strongly pareto dominates the unique equilibrium in the corresponding GEI
economy, and cannot be pareto dominated by the unique equilibrium in the corre-
sponding Arrow-Debreu economy. Therefore, even when asset markets are incom-
plete, and the GEI equilibrium is strongly pareto inefficient, a Bankruptcy equilib-
rium can result in an efficient market outcome. We shall also see that an increase
in the credit limit of a debtor increases the equilibrium trade in the asset, and
the equilibrium utility of the creditor even though, in some state of the world, the
creditor expects the debtor to be bankrupt and cause her greater losses. There-
fore, creditors might want to make it easier for a debtor to take on more debt even
when they expect the debtor to become bankrupt in some state of the world. We
shall also see that the allocation in a Bankruptcy equilibrium is the same as in the
(unique) equilibrium in the corresponding Arrow-Debreu economy. Therefore, even
when asset markets are incomplete, and the GEI equilibrium is strongly pareto inef-
ficient, a Bankruptcy equilibrium can overcome market incompleteness and achieve
the same allocation as in the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium. Finally, we shall also see
that a decrease in exemption increases the equilibrium utility of the creditor and
decreases the equilibrium utility of the debtor. Therefore, creditors want to lobby
the legislature for lower exemptions, and debtors want to oppose such a measure.
The intuition for these results is that if the debtor has enough resources to repay
her debt in a state in which the creditor likes to consume, then the creditor is
better off if the debtor is allowed to take on more debt. This dynamic becomes
more beneficial for the creditor when the exemption in this state is low so that the
creditor can recover more of her promised payment from the debtor.
In the next subsection, the details of the first example are presented. In the
subsection after that, the details of the second example are presented.
4.1 First Example
In this example, we shall see that if the decision-making environment of the agents
is governed by the GEI model, the only possible equilibrium utilities are those
which agents get from consuming their endowments. Therefore, in this environment,
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markets serve no useful purpose. However, if the decision-making environment is
governed by the Bankruptcy model, then in every Bankruptcy equilibrium, utilities
are at least as high as those in the GEI model. Also, there are two equilibria
in the Bankruptcy model, each of which pareto dominates the equilibrium in the
GEI model, and in each of which there is trade in the asset and the debtor is not
necessarily credit constrained; that is he might choose not to exhaust his credit limit
fully. (In fact, these are the only equilibria in which there is trade in the asset.)
Therefore, with the additional institution of bankruptcy, markets can become useful,
and can lead to better outcomes. Finally, we shall see the effect of different levels
of exemption on equilibrium outcomes. If exemptions are too large there is no
possibility of debt recovery, and hence no trade in the asset.
Consider an exchange economy in which there are two time periods, indexed
1 and 2, and two states of the world, indexed 1 and 2. There is no information
in period 1, and full information in period 2. There is one consumption good in
period 1, and in each state in period 2. The consumption space is <3+. An element
x = (x1, x2(1), x2(2)) in the consumption space is a consumption plan which entails
consumption of x1 units of the consumption good in period 1, and x2(s) units of






. The portfolio space is <. An element z of the portfolio space is a portfolio
plan which entails holding of z units of the asset. Prices in period 1 are given by
(p1, q), where p1 is the price of the consumption good, and q the price of the asset.
The price of the consumption good is 1 in each state in period 2. There are two
agents, indexed 1 and 2. The preference and endowment of each agent is
U1 = x1 + x2(1) + 100x2(2), w1 = (1, 10, 1),
U2 = x1 + 100x2(1) + x2(2), w2 = (1, 1, 10).
In the GEI model,22 if prices are (p1, q) with p1 > 0, the affordability constraints
for agents i = 1, 2 that are relevant to this analysis are
0 ≤ xi1 = 1−
q
p1
zi, and 0 ≤ xi2(s) = wi2(s) + zi (s = 1, 2).
These constraints mean that in every period and state, the value of consumption of
every agent equals her income. In the Bankruptcy model, suppose the exemption
is (e(1), e(2)), and the credit limit for agent i is Ci(q). If prices are (p1, q) with
p1 > 0, and default rates are α = (α(1), α(2)), the affordability constraints for
agents i = 1, 2 that are relevant to this analysis are
0 ≤ xi1 = 1− qp1 zi, and
0 ≤ xi2(s) = max( wi2(s) + (1− α(s))zi+ − zi− , min(e(s), wi2(s)) ) (s = 1, 2).
Also, credit limit restrictions mean that for every agent i, zi− ≤ Ci(q).
22For details of the GEI model, see Magill and Quinzii (1996).
26
Contributions to Theoretical Economics , Vol. 3 [2003], Iss. 1, Art. 1
Brought to you by | University of Kansas Libraries (University of Kansas Libraries)
Authenticated | 172.16.1.226
Download Date | 3/20/12 8:14 PM
In this example, if agents just consume their endowments, their utilities are
(U1, U2) = (111, 111), and if their decision-making environment is determined by
the GEI model then markets serve no useful purpose, because the unique GEI equi-
librium utilities are also (U1, U2) = (111, 111). We can check for the GEI equilibrium
as follows. Using the affordability constraints for each agent, we can re-write the







≥ 0 ⇔ p1 ≥ 1102 , and U2 = 111+(101− qp1 )z2, so that dU
2
dz2
≥ 0 ⇔ p1 ≥ 1102 .
This helps us determine the optimal portfolio choice of each agent. If p1 < 1102 , the
optimal portfolio choice of each agent is z1 = z2 = −1. If p1 > 1102 , the optimal
portfolio choice of each agent is z1 = z2 = p1q . If p1 =
1
102 , the optimal portfolio
choice of each agent is z1, z2 ∈ [−1, 1101 ]. Notice that if the asset market is to clear, it
must be that p1 = 1102 . Therefore, the unique equilibrium prices in the GEI model
are (p1, q) = ( 1102 ,
101
102). For ξ ∈ [− 1101 , 1101 ], the corresponding consumption and
portfolio plan for agent 1 is given by x1 = (1− 101ξ, 10 + ξ, 1 + ξ), z1 = ξ and that
for agent 2 is given by x2 = (1+101ξ, 1−ξ, 10−ξ), z2 = −ξ. The unique equilibrium
utilities are given by (U1, U2) = (111, 111), and in this situation, markets serve no
useful purpose.
Notice that in this example, every Bankruptcy equilibrium is at least as good as
the GEI equilibrium. This is because for each agent, the consumption and portfolio
plan consisting of her endowment and no trade in the asset is always in the agent’s
budget set. (This is independent of exemptions and credit limits.) Therefore, in
each bankruptcy equilibrium, U1 ≥ 111 and U2 ≥ 111.
Also, the following Bankruptcy equilibrium pareto dominates the GEI equilib-
rium, and in this equilibrium there is trade in the asset, and the debtor is not credit
constrained. Suppose (e(1), e(2)) = (1, 1) and C1(q) = C2(q) = 8q. Then






), α = (0, 1), x1 = (2, 9, 1), z1 = −1, x2 = (0, 2, 10), z2 = 1
is an equilibrium with utilities (U1, U2) = (111, 210). To check that this is an
equilibrium, notice that all markets are clearing, the default rate calculations are
correct and for each agent, her plan is in her budget set. The only thing left
to confirm is that agents are optimizing. Let us first look at the plan for agent 1.
Substituting the value of q in the credit limit for agent 1 shows that every admissible
portfolio, z1, must satisfy z1− ≤ 4. The affordability constraints which are relevant
to this analysis are
0 ≤ x11 = 1− z1, 0 ≤ x12(1) = 10 + z1 (since z1− ≤ 4) and 0 ≤ x12(2) = 1,
whence, U1 = 1−z1+z1+10+100(1) = 111 (irrespective of choice of z1). Therefore,
the given plan is optimal in the budget set for agent 1. Similarly, the analysis
for agent 2 gives us23 U2 = 1 − z2 + 100(max(1 + z2, 1)) + 10 − z2−. If z2 ≤ 0,
23for portfolio admissibility, z2− ≤ 4. The affordability constraints are 0 ≤ x21 = 1− z2 (⇒ z2 ≤
1), 0 ≤ x22(1) = max(1 + z2, 1), and 0 ≤ x22(2) = 10− z2− (since z2− ≤ 4).
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then U2 = 1 − z2 + 100 + 10 + z2 = 111 (irrespective of z2). If z2 ≥ 0, then
U2 = 1 − z2 + 100(1 + z2) + 10 = 111 + 99z2, whence the optimal choice of z2 is
1 and U2 = 210. We conclude that the given plan is optimal in the budget set for
agent 2.
With the same exemption and credit limits, and using the same argument as
above, it is easy to check that






), α = (1, 0), x1 = (0, 10, 2), z1 = 1, x2 = (2, 1, 9), z2 = −1
is also a Bankruptcy equilibrium that pareto dominates the GEI equilibrium, and
in this equilibrium also there is trade in the asset and the debtor is not credit
constrained.
With the same exemption and credit limits, these are the only Bankruptcy equi-
libria in which there is trade in the asset. We can see this as follows. Suppose there is
an equilibrium with p1 < 12 and z
1 6= 0. One possibility is that agent 1 sells the asset.
If z1 < 0, then, because −8 ≤ z1, we have U1 = 1− qp1 z1 + max(10 + z1, 1) + 100 =
111 + (1− qp1 )z1, so that dU
1
dz1
≥ 0 ⇔ p1 ≥ 12 . Therefore, the optimal portfolio choice
for agent 1 is z1 = −8q. Also, −8 ≤ z1 < 0 implies that the loss from agent one in
state one is zero, and in state two is z1−, so that the default rate is α = (0, 1). Also,




≥ 0 ⇔ p1 ≥ 1101 . If p1 < 1101 , then no positive portfolio choice
is optimal for agent 2 which contradicts z2 > 0. If p1 = 1101 , then agent 1 sells
8q = 800101 units of the asset, but agent 2 can buy at most
1
100 units of the asset.
This contradicts asset market clearing. If 1101 < p1 <
1
2 , then the optimal portfolio
choice for agent 2 is z2 = p1q =
1−q
q . Asset market clearing implies that the price




16 ≈ 0.297, so that p1 > 12 , a contradiction. Therefore, it cannot be that
z1 < 0. The other possibility is that agent 1 buys the asset. If z1 > 0, then asset
market clearing implies that z2 < 0. Using the same argument as above, we can
see that this is impossible. Therefore, there is no equilibrium with p1 < 12 and
z1 6= 0. Suppose there is an equilibrium with p1 > 12 , and z1 6= 0. If z1 < 0, then
U1 = 111 + (1 − qp1 )z1, so that dU
1
dz1
≥ 0 ⇔ p1 ≥ 12 , from which it follows that no
negative portfolio choice is optimal for agent 1, which contradicts z1 < 0. Similarly,
if z1 > 0, then z2 < 0, so that dU
2
dz2
≥ 0 ⇔ p1 ≥ 12 , from which it follows that no
negative portfolio choice is optimal for agent 2, which contradicts z2 < 0. Therefore,
there is no equilibrium with p1 > 12 and z
1 6= 0. We conclude that in an equilibrium
in which there is trade in the asset the prices have to be (p1, q) = (12 ,
1
2). With a
little more work, it is easy to see that with the given exemptions and credit limits,
the only equilibria in which there is trade in the asset are the ones given above.
Now let us see how exemption levels can affect equilibrium outcomes. Intuitively,
when exemptions are large, a creditor wants to buy less of the asset, and the debtor
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wants to sell more of the asset, because large exemptions reduce the portion of a
debtor’s income which can be confiscated to repay her debt. If the exemption for an
agent is too large it could be that in an equilibrium this agent cannot sell the asset.
The next version of this example shows that if exemptions are too large and prices
are (p1, q) = (12 ,
1
2), then in every Bankruptcy equilibrium there is no trade. Suppose
(e(1), e(2)) = (e(1), 1) with 6 < e(1) < 10, 6 < e(2) < 10 C1(q) = C2(q) = 8q, and
(p1, q) = (12 ,
1
2). Suppose that at these prices there is an equilibrium with z
1 < 0. If
e(1)−10 ≤ z1 < 0, then U1 = 1− z1 + z1 +10+100(1) = 111 (irrespective of choice
of z1), and if −4 ≤ z1 ≤ e(1)− 10, then U1 = 101 + e(1)− z1, so that the optimal
portfolio choice for agent 1 is z1 = −4, and U1 = 105 + e(1) > 111. Asset market
clearing implies that z2 = 4. Combined with the affordability constraint for agent 2
in period 1, we have 0 ≤ 1− z2 = −3, a contradiction. Therefore, with these prices,
in any equilibrium in which there is trade in the asset, it must be that z1 > 0, and
hence z2 < 0. But a similar calculation shows that z2 > 0, a contradiction. Thus in
this version there is no trade in equilibrium. This result generalizes a little, as the
following proposition shows.
Proposition. Consider the Bankruptcy model with 2 time periods and 1 asset. In
every economy represented by this model, if for every s A(s) > 0 ⇒ e(s) ≥ supi wi2(s)
then in every Bankruptcy equilibrium of this economy there is no trade in the asset.
Proof. Let (p, q, α, (xi, zi)i∈I) be an equilibrium. If q = 0, then the credit limit
for almost every agent is 0, so that almost nobody sells the asset. As the as-
set market is clearing, it must also be that almost nobody is buying the asset.
Also, if q > 0 there is no trade in the asset. For if there is trade in the asset,
that is, if µ(
{
i ∈ I ∣zi− > 0
}
) > 0, then for every state s such that A(s) > 0,
µ(
{
i ∈ I ∣p2(s)1A(s)zi− > 0
}











. Also, the loss from agent i in such
a state is λi(s) = min(p2(s)1A(s)zi− − p2(s)1(1− α(s))A(s)zi+, 0) from which it fol-
lows that the loss from agent i on this asset is βi(s) = p2(s)1A(s)zi−. Therefore,
α(s) = 1, so that for every i, p2(s)1(1 − α(s))A(s)zi+ = 0. Of course, in a state in
which A(s) = 0, we also have, for every i, p2(s)1(1 − α(s))A(s)zi+ = 0. Thus, in
every state and for every i, p2(s)1(1 − α(s))A(s)zi+ = 0. As q > 0, using strong
monotonicity of preferences, it must be that for almost every i, zi+ = 0, and this
contradicts the fact that asset markets are clearing. Therefore, whether q = 0 or
q > 0, there is no trade in the asset.
An application of this result to this example shows that if exemptions are too
large (e(1) ≥ 10 and e(2) ≥ 10) then in every Bankruptcy equilibrium there is
no trade in the asset and hence the unique equilibrium utilities are (U1, U2) =
(111, 111). Notice that this result is independent of credit limits, and the proof uses
only strong monotonicity of preferences. An analogous result holds in the model
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with many time periods and one asset. We shall not look at it in this paper. A
summary of the different versions of this example is given in Table 1 at the end of
this paper.
4.2 Second Example
In this example, we shall see that if the decision-making environment of the agents
is governed by the Arrow-Debreu model, then there is a unique equilibrium which
is, of course, pareto efficient. If this environment is governed by the GEI model,
then there is a unique equilibrium which is strongly pareto inefficient. If this envi-
ronment is governed by the Bankruptcy model, then there is an equilibrium which
is pareto optimal, which strongly dominates the GEI equilibrium, and which can-
not be dominated by the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium. Therefore, even when asset
markets are incomplete, and the GEI equilibrium is strongly pareto inefficient, a
Bankruptcy equilibrium can result in an efficient market outcome. We shall also see
that an increase in the credit limit of a debtor increases the equilibrium trade in the
asset, and the equilibrium utility of the creditor even though, in some state of the
world, the creditor expects the debtor to be bankrupt, and cause her greater losses.
Therefore, creditors might want to make it easier for a debtor to take on more debt
even when they expect the debtor to become bankrupt in some state of the world.
We shall also see that the allocation in a Bankruptcy equilibrium is the same as
in the (unique) equilibrium in the corresponding Arrow-Debreu economy. There-
fore, even when asset markets are incomplete, and the GEI equilibrium is strongly
pareto inefficient, a Bankruptcy equilibrium can overcome market incompleteness
and achieve the same allocation as in the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium. Finally, we
shall also see that a decrease in exemption increases the equilibrium utility of the
creditor, and decreases the equilibrium utility of the debtor. Therefore, creditors
want to lobby the legislature for lower exemptions, and debtors want to oppose such
a measure.
Consider an exchange economy in which there are two time periods, indexed
1 and 2, and two states of the world, indexed 1 and 2. There is no information
in period 1, and full information in period 2. There is one consumption good in
period 1 and in each state in period 2. The consumption space is <3+. An element
x = (x1, x2(1), x2(2)) in the consumption space is a consumption plan which entails
consumption of x1 units of the consumption good in period 1, and x2(s) units of






. The portfolio space is <. An element z of the portfolio space is a portfolio
plan which entails holding of z units of the asset. Prices in period 1 are given by
(p1, q), where p1 is the price of the consumption good, and q the price of the asset.
These prices satisfy 0 ≤ p1 ≤ 1, and q = 1− p1. The price of the consumption good
is 1 in each state in period 2. There are two agents, indexed 1 and 2. The preference
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and endowment of each agent is
U1 = 100x1 + x2(1) + 50x2(2), w1 = (1, 10, 1),
U2 = x1 + 100x2(1) + x2(2), w2 = (10, 1, 0).
In the GEI model, if prices are (p1, q) with p1 > 0, the affordability constraints for
agents i = 1, 2 that are relevant to this analysis are
0 ≤ xi1 = 1−
q
p1
zi, and 0 ≤ xi2(s) = wi2(s) + zi (s = 1, 2).
These constraints mean that in every period and state, the value of consumption of
every agent equals her income. In the Bankruptcy model, suppose the exemption
is (e(1), e(2)), and the credit limit for agent i is Ci(q). If prices are (p1, q) with
p1 > 0, and default rates are α = (α(1), α(2)), the affordability constraints for
agents i = 1, 2 that are relevant to this analysis are
0 ≤ xi1 = 1− qp1 zi, and
0 ≤ xi2(s) = max( wi2(s) + (1− α(s))zi+ − zi− , min(e(s), wi2(s)) ) (s = 1, 2).
Also, credit limit restrictions mean that for every agent i, zi− ≤ Ci(q).
If the agents just consume their endowments, their utilities are (U1, U2) =
(160, 110), if their decision-making environment is determined by the complete mar-
kets Arrow-Debreu model, their unique (and pareto efficient) equilibrium utilities
are (U1, U2) = (1150, 1100),24 and if their decision-making environment is deter-
mined by the GEI model, their unique (and strongly pareto inefficient) equilibrium
utilities are (U1, U2) = (1109, 201). We can check for the GEI equilibrium as fol-
lows. Using the affordability constraints for each agent, we can re-write the utility







≥ 0 ⇔ p1 ≥ 100151 , and U2 = 110+ (101− qp1 )z2 so that dU
2
dz2
≥ 0 ⇔ p1 ≥ 1102 .
This helps us determine the optimal portfolio choice of each agent. If p1 < 1102 , the
optimal portfolio choice of each agent is z1 = −1 and z2 = 0. If p1 = 1102 , the choice
is z1 = −1 and z2 ∈ [0, 10101 ]. If 110 < p1 < 100151 , the choice is z1 = −1 and z2 = 10p1q .
If p1 = 100151 , the choice is z
1 ∈ [−1, 100151 ] and z2 = 100051 . If 100151 < p1, the choice is
z1 = p1q and z
2 = 10p1q . Thus, if asset market is to clear, it must be that
10p1
q = 1
and hence p1 = 111 . Therefore,






), x1 = (11, 9, 0), z1 = −1, x2 = (0, 2, 1), z2 = 1
is the unique equilibrium with utilities (U1, U2) = (1109, 201).







) and x1 =
(11, 0, 1), x2 = (0, 11, 0).
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The following Bankruptcy equilibrium is pareto efficient, strongly pareto dom-
inates the GEI equilibrium and cannot be pareto dominated by the Arrow-Debreu
equilibrium. Therefore, even when asset markets are incomplete and the GEI
equilibrium is strongly pareto inefficient, a Bankruptcy equilibrium can result in
an efficient market outcome. Suppose (e(1), e(2)) = (1, 1), C1(q) = 19×910 q, and
C2(q) = 1910q. Then






), α = (0, 1), x1 = (11, 1, 1), z1 = −9, x2 = (0, 10, 0), z2 = 9
is an equilibrium with utilities (U1, U2) = (1151, 1000). To see that this is a
Bankruptcy equilibrium, substitute ξ = 9 in the parameterization given below.
In a parameterized version of this example, we can see that an increase in the
credit limit of a debtor increases the equilibrium trade in the asset, and the equi-
librium utility of the creditor even though, in some state of the world, the creditor
expects the debtor to be bankrupt, and cause her greater losses. Therefore, creditors
might want to make it easier for a debtor to take on more debt even when they expect
the debtor to be bankrupt in some state of the world. Suppose (e(1), e(2)) = (1, 1).
Fix ξ ∈ [1, 9] and let C1(q) = (10+ξ)ξ10 q and C2(q) = 10+ξ10 q. Then
(p1, q) = ( ξ10+ξ ,
10
10+ξ ), α = (0, 1), x
1 = (11, 10− ξ, 1), z1 = −ξ,
x2 = (0, 1 + ξ, 0), z2 = ξ
is an equilibrium with utilities (U1, U2) = (1160 − ξ, 100 + 100ξ). Notice that this
equilibrium allocation is pareto efficient. To check that this is an equilibrium, notice
that all markets are clearing, the default rate calculations are correct, and for each
agent, her plan is in her budget set. The only thing left to confirm is that agents
are optimizing. Let us first look at the plan for agent 1. Substituting the value
of q in the credit limit for agent 1 gives us, for portfolio admissibility, z1− ≤ ξ. If
z1 ≥ 0, then U1 = 100(1 − qp1 z1) + 10 + (1 − α(1))z1 + 50(1 + (1 − α(2))z1) =
160 + (1 − 1000ξ )z1. Since the coefficient for z1 is negative, the optimal portfolio
choice is zero, and the corresponding utility is U1 = 160. If −ξ ≤ z1 ≤ 0, then
U1 = 100(1− qp1 z1)+10+z1 +50 = 160+(1− 1000ξ )z1, so that the optimal portfolio
choice is z1 = −ξ, and the corresponding utility is U1 = 1160 − ξ. Therefore,
the given plan is optimal in the budget set for agent 1. For agent 2, substituting
the value of q in the credit limit for agent 1 gives us, for portfolio admissibility,
z2− ≤ 1. If z2 ≥ 0, then U2 = (10− qp1 z2) + 100(1 + (1− α(1))z2) + (1− α(2))z2 =
110+(100− 10ξ )z2. Since the coefficient for z2 is positive, the optimal portfolio choice
is z2 = 10 ξ10 , and the corresponding utility is U
2 = 100 + 100ξ. If −1 ≤ z2 ≤ 0,
then U2 = 110 + (100 − 10ξ )z2, so that the optimal portfolio choice is 0, and the
corresponding utility is U2 = 110. Therefore, the given plan is optimal in the budget
set for agent 2.
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Notice that in this parameterizaton, when ξ = 9, the equilibrium allocation
is very close to the equilibrium allocation for the Arrow-Debreu model. It is the
exemption in state 1 which prevents the creditor from recovering the last unit of
consumption from the debtor. This creates an incentive for the creditor to lobby
for lower exemptions. One might guess that if the exemption in state 1 were lower
the creditor is willing to extend even more credit to the debtor. This is correct, as
shown below.
In the following Bankruptcy equilibrium the allocation is the same as the one
in the unique equilibrium in the corresponding Arrow-Debreu economy. There-
fore, even when asset markets are incomplete and the GEI equilibrium is strongly
pareto inefficient, a Bankruptcy equilibrium can overcome market incompleteness,
and achieve the same allocation as in the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium. Suppose
(e(1), e(2)) = (0, 1), C1(q) = 20q, and C2(q) = 2q. Then






); α = (0, 1); x1 = (11, 0, 1), z1 = −10; x2 = (0, 11, 0), z2 = 10
is an equilibrium with utilities (U1, U2) = (1150, 1100). To see that this is a
Bankruptcy equilibrium, substitute ξ = 0 in the parameterization given below.
In another parameterized version of this example, we can see that a decrease in
the exemption in state 1 can further increase the equilibrium trade in the asset, and
the equilibrium utility of the creditor, and decrease the equilibrium utility of the
debtor. Therefore, creditors want to lobby a legislature for lower exemptions, and
debtors want to oppose such a measure. Fix ξ ∈ [0, 1]. Suppose (e(1), e(2)) = (ξ, 1),
C1(q) = (20−ξ)(10−ξ)10 q and C
2(q) = (20−ξ)(1−ξ)10 q. Then
(p1, q) = (10−ξ20−ξ ,
10
20−ξ ), α = (0, 1), x
1 = (11, ξ, 1), z1 = ξ − 10,
x2 = (0, 11− ξ, 0), z2 = 10− ξ
is an equilibrium with utilities (U1, U2) = (1150 + ξ, 1100− 100ξ). Notice that this
equilibrium allocation is pareto efficient. To check that this is an equilibrium, notice
that all markets are clearing, the default rate calculations are correct, and for each
agent, her plan is in her budget set. The only thing left to confirm is that agents
are optimizing. Let us first look at the plan for agent 1. Substituting the value of
q in the credit limit for agent 1 gives us, for portfolio admissibility, z1− ≤ 10 − ξ.
If z1 ≥ 0, then U1 = 100(1 − qp1 z1) + 10 + (1 − α(1))z1 + 50(1 + (1 − α(2))z1) =
160 + (1 − 100010−ξ )z1. Since the coefficient for z1 is negative, the optimal portfolio
choice is zero, and the corresponding utility is U1 = 160. If ξ − 10 ≤ z1 ≤ 0, then
U1 = 100(1− qp1 z1)+10+z1 +50 = 160+(1− 100010−ξ )z1, so that the optimal portfolio
choice is z1 = ξ − 10, and the corresponding utility is U1 = 1150 + ξ. Therefore,
the given plan is optimal in the budget set for agent 1. For agent 2, substituting
the value of q in the credit limit for agent 1 gives us, for portfolio admissibility,
z2− ≤ 1 − ξ. If z2 ≥ 0, then U2 = (10 − qp1 z2) + 100(1 + (1 − α(1))z2) + (1 −
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α(2))z2 = 110 + (100− 1010−ξ )z2. Since the coefficient for z2 is positive, the optimal
portfolio choice is z2 = 1010−ξ10 , and the corresponding utility is U
2 = 1100 − ξ. If
ξ− 1 ≤ z2 ≤ 0, then U2 = 110+(100− 1010−ξ )z2, so that the optimal portfolio choice
is 0, and the corresponding utility is U2 = 110. Therefore, the given plan is optimal
in the budget set for agent 2.
A summary of the different versions of this example is given in Table 2 at the
end of the paper.
5 Extensions and Conclusion
This section presents some ways in which we may modify and extend the model.
In the model, a credit limit is specified in units of the asset or in units of good
` = 1 (depending on the asset return matrix). However, we sometimes observe that
a credit limit is specified in units of value. It is easy to modify the model to allow
for admissibility of a portfolio plan to depend on value of promised delivery instead
of quantity. If we rename admissibility in the model as quantity admissibility, and
call by value admissibility the admissibility of a portfolio plan depending on value of
promised delivery, and use these concepts to redefine the budget and demand sets,
we get two definitions of equilibrium. However, every equilibrium with quantity
admissibility is also an equilibrium with value admissibility and vice versa. (This
is because strong monotonicity and continuity of preferences implies that in every
equilibrium — whether with quantity or value admissibility — the price of every
good is positive. Therefore, the budget set with quantity admissibility and the one
with value admissibility coincide and hence so do the demand sets.)
The model can be extended to include assets which promise to pay in more
than one good as follows. The basic concepts, except the assumptions about pay-
offs of assets, remain the same. The payoffs of the assets in period t, state s are
summarized by a L × J matrix At(s). Its `j-th component, At(s)`,j , specifies the
(non-negative) payoff of asset j in period t, state s in terms of good `. As in
the model, assume that for every s, A1(s) is the zero matrix, and to reflect the
dependence of asset returns on the information available, assume that for every
t, At(·) is St-measurable. An asset structure is a collection of asset return ma-
trices, A = (At(s))s,t. The rights of creditors and debtors remain the same. To
determine the financial position of an agent, in all the definitions, pre-multiply
At(s) by pt(s) instead of pt(s)1. A credit limit for agent i is a continuous function
Ci : Q × RJ+ → RLJ+ that is weakly decreasing in β. As in the model, assume the
measurability and boundedness conditions, and assume that for every `, j, s, t with





i(q, β)t(s)`,j > 0
}
) > 0, and if qt(s)j = 0 then
µ(
{
i ∈ I ∣Ci(q, 0)t(s)`,j = 0
}
) = µ(I). A portfolio plan zi is (Ci, p, q, α)- admissible
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if for every period `, j, s, t with t ≤ T − 1,
if there is s′ ∈ Et(s) and `′ ≥ 1 with At+1(s′)`′,j > 0,
then At+1(s)`,j(zit(s)−)j ≤ Ci(q, βi(p, q, α, zi))t(s)`,j ,
otherwise (zit(s)−)j ≤ Ci(q, βi(p, q, α, zi))t(s)`,j .
The lemma on bound on asset sales remains true as stated. Its proof needs an
obvious modification. The budget set, demand set, economy, and equilibrium are
defined as in the model. Theorem 1 remains true as stated. Theorem 2 is true if
everywhere in its statement, we replace j by `, j. The proofs require minor and
obvious modifications. The examples obviously remains true. Thus, the model can
be extended to include assets which promise to pay in more than one good.
In the model, exemptions are specified in each period and state by comparing
the endowment value of each good in that period and state to the corresponding
exemption value of that good. This can be modified to allow for different ways of
calculating exemptions. For example, it is easy to modify the definition of exemption
to compare the value of the endowment bundle in each period t, state s with the
value of the corresponding exemption bundle. Other than a change in the definition
of exemption value, the theorems and the examples are valid, and the proof remains
the same. For another example, although the U.S. Constitution gives the power
to establish bankruptcy law to the Federal government, in practice, different states
have different exemptions. We can modify the model in this paper by using another
parameter to index agent’s by state, by specifying a strictly positive exemption
bundle by state, and then calculating exemptions either in the manner specified in
the model in the paper, or in the modification presented earlier in this paragraph.
Again, the results and the examples in the paper are valid. More general formulas
for calculating exemption values are also feasible; what is important in the proof of
existence of equilibrium is that agents have positive income.
These modifications and extensions can be combined to derive a model in which
assets promise delivery of many goods, and in which admissibility of a portfolio plan
depends on value of promised delivery. A version of the two theorems is true for any
economy represented by this derived model, and the examples given in the paper
are valid.
The model in this paper incorporates a notion of personal bankruptcy in general
equilibrium with incomplete markets. In this model, there is unsecured lending, the
rights of debtors and creditors are derived from the existing legal framework, an
agent’s default history affects his future trading opportunity, and bankruptcy arises
in a manner similar to what we observe. Every economy represented by this model
has an equilibrium, and with minor additional assumptions, every economy has a
non-trivial equilibrium. This model is robust in the sense that using it, we can easily
see well-known welfare effects of bankruptcy.
This model can be used to investigate the effects on resource allocation in com-
petitive markets of different bankruptcy rules (exemptions, recovery rules, priority
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rules), of different credit limit systems (the weight that should be put on an agent’s
default history, on expectations of an agent’s future income, on riskiness of assets),
and of chain reactions (the role of pessimistic expectations, controlling and mit-
igating the effects of such reactions, the role of credit limits and exemptions in
propagating and controlling such reactions).
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Appendix
Table 1
U1 = x1 + x2(1) + 100x2(2) ; w1 = (1, 10, 1)
U2 = x1 + 100x2(1) + x2(2) ; w2 = (1, 1, 10)
Market Variables Agent 1 Agent 2
Prices Default Plan Utility Plan Utility
Rate x1 z1 U1 x2 z2 U2
Endowment (1,10,1) 111 (1,1,10) 111
GEI ( 1102 ,
101
102) (1,10,1) 0 111 (1,1,10) 0 111
e(1) = 1, e(2) = 1, C1(q) = C2(q) = 8q
Bankruptcy (12 ,
1
2) (0,1) (2,9,1) -1 111 (0,2,10) 1 210
(12 ,
1
2) (1,0) (0,10,2) 1 210 (2,1,9) -1 111
1 ≤ e(1) ≤ 6, e(2) = 1, C1(q) = C2(q) = 8q
Bankruptcy (12 ,
1
2) (0,1) (2,9,1) -1 111 (0,2,10) 1 210
(12 ,
1
2) (1,0) (0,10,2) 1 210 (2,1,9) -1 111
6 < e(1) < 10, e(2) = 1, C1(q) = C2(q) = 8q
Bankruptcy (12 ,
1
2) (1,0) (0,10,2) 1 210 (2,1,9) -1 111
10 ≤ e(1), 10 ≤ e(2), C1(q) = C2(q) = 8q
Bankruptcy (1,0) (1,1) (1,10,1) 0 111 (1,1,10) 0 111
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Table 2
U1 = 100x1 + x2(1) + 50x2(2) ; w1 = (1, 10, 1)
U2 = x1 + 100x2(1) + x2(2) ; w2 = (10, 1, 0)
Market Variables Agent 1 Agent 2
Prices Default Plan Utility Plan Utility
Rate x1 z1 U1 x2 z2 U2





5) (11,0,1) 1150 (0,11,0) 1100
GEI ( 111 ,
10
11) (11,9,0) -1 1109 (0,2,1) 1 201
e(1) = 1, e(2) = 1, C1(q) = 19×910 q, C
2(q) = 1910q
Bankruptcy ( 919 ,
10
19) (0,1) (11,1,1) -9 1151 (0,10,0) 9 1000
e(1) = 0, e(2) = 1, C1(q) = 20q, C2(q) = 2q
Bankruptcy (12 ,
1
2) (0,1) (11,0,1) -10 1150 (0,11,0) 10 1100
The parameterizations given in the text are as follows:
1. Let e(1) = 1, e(2) = 1 and for ξ ∈ [1, 9], let C1(q) = (10+ξ)ξ10 q, C2(q) =
10+ξ
10 q. Then
(p1, q) = ( ξ10+ξ ,
10
10+ξ ), α = (0, 1),
x1 = (11, 10− ξ, 1), z1 = −ξ, x2 = (0, 1 + ξ, 0), z2 = ξ
is an equilibrium with utilities (U1, U2) = (1160− ξ, 100 + 100ξ).
2. For ξ ∈ [0, 1] , let e(1) = ξ, e(2) = 1, C1(q) = (20−ξ)(10−ξ)10 q, C2(q) =
(20−ξ)(1−ξ)
10 q. Then
(p1, q) = (10−ξ20−ξ ,
10
20−ξ ), α = (0, 1),
x1 = (11, ξ, 1), z1 = ξ − 10, x2 = (0, 11− ξ, 0), z2 = 10− ξ
is an equilibrium with utilities (U1, U2) = (1150 + ξ, 1100− 100ξ).
38
Contributions to Theoretical Economics , Vol. 3 [2003], Iss. 1, Art. 1
Brought to you by | University of Kansas Libraries (University of Kansas Libraries)
Authenticated | 172.16.1.226
Download Date | 3/20/12 8:14 PM
References
Aghion, P., and B. Hermalin (1990): “Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts
Can Enhance Efficiency,” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 6(2),
381–409.
Alvarez, F., and U. Jermann (2000): “Efficiency, Equilibrium, and Asset Pricing
with Risk of Default,” Econometrica, 68(4), 775–797.
Araujo, A., and M. Pascoa (2002): “Bankruptcy in a Model of Unsecured
Claims,” Economic Theory, 20(3), 455–481.
Bernanke, B., M. Gertler, and S. Gilchrist (1996): “The Financial Acceler-
ator and The Flight to Quality,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 78(1),
1–15.
Chatterjee, S., D. Corbae, M. Nakajima, and J.-V. Rios-Rull (2002):
“A Quantitative Theory of Unsecured Consumer Credit with Risk of Default,”
Mimeo.
Debreu, G. (1959): The Theory of Value. New York: Wiley.
Dubey, P., J. Geanakoplos, and M. Shubik (1997): “Default and Efficiency
in a General Equilibrium Model with Incomplete Markets,” Mimeo. Based on
Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No.713, 1990.
Dubey, P., J. Geanakoplos, and W. Zame (1997): “Collateral, Default and
Market Crashes,” Mimeo.
Dunscomb(Jr.), S. W. (1898): “The Federal Bankruptcy Law,” Political Science
Quarterly, 13(4), 606–616.
Epstein, D. G. (1995): Bankruptcy and Other Debtor-Creditor Laws. West Pub-
lishing Co.
Hart, O., and J. Moore (1994): “A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability
of Human Capital,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(4), 841–879.
Hildenbrand, W. (1974): Core and Equilibria of a Large Economy. Princeton
University Press.
Kehoe, T., and D. Levine (1993): “Debt-Constrained Asset Markets,” The Re-
view of Economic Studies, 60(4), 865–888.
Kiyotaki, N., and J. Moore (1997): “Credit Cycles,” Journal of Political Econ-
omy, 105(2), 211–248.
39
Sabarwal: Competitive Equilibria, Incomplete Markets, Endogenous Bankruptcy
Brought to you by | University of Kansas Libraries (University of Kansas Libraries)
Authenticated | 172.16.1.226
Download Date | 3/20/12 8:14 PM
Kocherlakota, N. (1996): “Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Com-
mittment,” The Review of Economic Studies, 63(4), 595–609.
Li, W., and P.-D. Sarte (2002): “The Macroeconomics of U.S. Consumer
Bankruptcy Choice: Chapter 7 or Chapter 13,” Mimeo.
Magill, M., and M. Quinzii (1996): Theory of Incomplete Markets. MIT Press.
Modica, M., A. Rustichini, and J.-M. Tallon (1999): “Unawareness and
Bankruptcy: A General Equilibrium Model,” Economic Theory, 12.
Radner, R. (1968): “Competitive Equilibrium Under Uncertainty,” Econometrica,
36(1), 31–58.
(1972): “Existence of Equilibrium of Plans, Prices, and Price Expectations
in a Sequence of Markets,” Econometrica, 40(2), 289–303.
Shubik, M. (1972): “Commodity Model, Oligopoly, Credit and Bankruptcy in a
General Equilibrium Model,” Western Economic Journal, 10, 24–38.
Shubik, M., and C. Wilson (1977): “The Optimal Bankruptcy Rule in a Trad-
ing Economy Using Fiat Money,” Zeitschrift fur Nationaklokonomie (Journal of
Economics), 37(3), 337–354, Reprinted as Cowles Foundation Paper No. 465.
Stiglitz, J., and A. Weiss (1981): “Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect
Competition,” American Economic Review, 71(3), 393–410.
Townsend, R. (1979): “Optimal Contracts and Competitive Markets with Costly
State Verification,” Journal of Economic Theory, 21(2), 265–293.
Wang, H.-J., and M. White (2000): “An Optimal Personal Bankruptcy Proce-
dure and Proposed Reforms,” Journal of Legal Studies, 29(1), 255–286.
Warren, C. (1935): Bankruptcy in United States History. Harvard University
Press.
White, M. J. (1998): “Why Don’t More Households File for Bankruptcy?,” Jour-
nal of Law, Economics and Organization, 14(2), 205–231.
Zame, W. (1993): “Efficiency and the Role of Default When Security Markets are
Incomplete,” American Economic Review, 83(5), 1142–1164.
40
Contributions to Theoretical Economics , Vol. 3 [2003], Iss. 1, Art. 1
Brought to you by | University of Kansas Libraries (University of Kansas Libraries)
Authenticated | 172.16.1.226
Download Date | 3/20/12 8:14 PM
